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Preface
The second Bergen Seminar on Development was organised by the Chr. Michelsen
Institute in collaboration with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its
Policy Planning and Evaluation Staff, and the Centre for Partnership in Development
(Diakonhjemmets Internasjonale Senter - DiS). It took place over two full days 1-3
March 1999, in the beautiful settings of the Solstrand Fjord Hotel dose to Bergen.
The 1999 Seminar was focused on institutional partnerships and twinning, and to
what extent these are effective mechanisms for promoting institutional development.
The overall objectives of the Bergen Seminars are to improve international
development policies based on reviews of Norwegian and international experiences;
develop recommendations to increase the quality of aid; and foster communication and
learning between academicians and aid practitioners.
Some 50 participants induded aid officials from 8 OECD countries, the IMF and the
W orId Bank; practitioners from public institutions and NGOs; and researchers,
evaluation consultants and re source persons from the South as well as the North. All
participants had been selected on the basis of their direct involvement and experience
in organisational cooperation and institution building, and members of the
OECD/DAC Informal Network on Institutional and Capacity Development had been
specially invited.
The Seminar was addressed by the Political Advisor to Norway's Minister of
International Development and Human Rights, Mr. Olav Kjørven, who made
reference to the efforts made in Norway to promote institutional twinning, but also
challenged the seminar to discuss these experiences. He reminded the participants of
the overall objective to find effective mechanisms for reducing poverty, and asked
whether institutional cooperation was sustainable, or whether it produced new forms
of dependency. Two keynote speakers, Professor Rehman Sobhan of the Centre for
Policy Dialogue (Bangladesh) and Kim Forss of Andante AB (Sweden) set the stage for
two intensive days of work, which induded presentation of case experiences, working
group sessions, plenary debates, a leeture by Professor Peter Blunt (Australia), and a
final panel debate.
The organisers wish to thank all participants who contributed as resource persons in
numerous ways during the Seminar. In particular we wish to thank Per Blystad, CarIos
Zacarias, Christoph Müller, Tanna Mengistu, Dean Yaremchuk and Eufasio
Mascarinas who presented three illustrative case stories; Inge Tvedten, Cathryn
Thorup, Erik Berg, Indumathi Rao, Mahesh Chandra, Aina Bergström, and Ole Petter
Opsand who all acted as moderators; and Heather Baser, Apollinaire Ndurokwigira,
Ingrid Ofstad and Moh'd Haflah Piei who participated as panelists.
The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) was responsible for the overall programme and all
practical organisation. The seminar committee was made up of Arve Ofstad (CMI),
Stein-Erik Kruse (DiS) and Erik Berg (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Henrik Lunden
(CMI) was engaged as the seminar coordinator. The organisers sought assistance from
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a number of colleagues, and wish to thank in particular Heather Baser (Cida),
Elisabeth Thioléron (OECD), Ole Petter Opsand (NORAD), Rolf Ree (Norwegian
MF A), Steinar Askvik (University of Bergen), Inge Tvedten and Alf Morten Jerve (both
CMI) for constructive advice during preparations.
The Centre for Partnership in Development (DiS) was an important collaborator.
Stein-Erik Kruse of DiS co-chaired the Seminar with Arve Ofstad.
The final thanks should go to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
sponsored the Seminar, and in particular to their Head of Division (Evaluation) Erik
Berg who actively supported and promoted this Seminar and took a personal interest
in its success. Additional support was provided by Special Advisor Helge Kjekshus and
Advisor Tor-Erik Gjerde, also of the Policy Planning and Evaluation Staff of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The summary of seminar proceedings and recommendations is partly based on inputs
from Steinar Askvik, Stein-Erik Kruse and Henrik Lunden, who assisted in taking
notes. The author is nevertheless solely responsible for the final version.
We hope that the outcome of this Seminar and in particular the lessons learned and
recommendations wil be considered useful - and used - by all practitioners and aid
officials in the South as well as in the North.
Bergen, November 1999
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Making South-North organisational cooperation
an effective instrument for institution building
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS. PREPARED BY ARVE OFSTAD
The Bergen Seminar on Development 1999 was focused on institutional partnerships
and twinning, and to what extent these are effective mechanisms for promoting
institutional development. This form of collaboration, whereby similar organisations
and institutions in the South and in the North enter into a medium to long term
co operative arrangement, has been increasingly promoted by several aid ageneies
during the 1990s as a supplement, and possibly an alternative, to the more traditional
technical assistance projects.
The purpose of the seminar was to review evaluations and experiences from this form
of collaboration, and promote lessons learned and recommendations. One important
aspect of most cases of institutional twinning as practised under bilateral aid
programmes, is that the choice of partner is limited to institutions in the donor country
and therefore may be regarded as a form of tie d aid.
The preconditions for institutional partnership and twinning -
clarifying the concepts
In his keynote address Rehman Sobhan set the stage for the seminar by focusing on the
ownership issue. Professor Sobhan presented an analysis of the role of institution
building and partnership in the larger context of governanee and aid-induced political
reforms. His main thrust was that "the crisis in the developing countries is perpetuated
by the increasing loss of ownership over their policyagendas during a decade of donor
driven policy reform and under pressures from the proeess of globalisation. This loss
of ownership has led to the de-accumulation of domestie institutional capacity and
eventually the de-Iegitimisation of the state, which has further aggravated the crisis of
governanee in many developing countries".
According to Sobhan, "any attempt to improve the effectiveness of aid lies in a
complete rethinking of not just the policyagendas associated with aid, but in the need
to restore ownership to the aid recipients over the design of domestie policy. (...) The
building of institutional partnerships between the developing and the developed
countries wil thus need to take account of the state of the prevailing aid relationship
between that developing country and its aid donors".
Following his analysis of how the established wisdom as expressed in the recent World
Bank research report on "Assessing Aid" does not seem to fit the Asian experience, he
returned to the overall significance that policy reforms had to be genera te d from
within the countries themselves. Unfortunately, much of the aid programmes and
policies have undermined this capacity of the domestie institutions, and many of the
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new NGOs in the South are even more aid dependent and have undermined existing
civil society.
The concept of institutional partnership therefore depends on the capacity for equal
participation by both sides. A real problem faced by many countries primarily in sub-
Saharan Africa is the degeneration of available institutional capacities. Donors wiling
to invest in such partnerships should thus focus on promoting local ownership over
policy, as a precondition for building sustainable institutions. "The operative issue
must be to leave it to the domestie institution to articulate this need out of their own
self-awareness of their professional limitatioris and willingness to use expatriate
institutions to build their professional base". Rehman finally pointed to the
opportunities for mak ing better use of skils and experiences of neighbouring and
other Third W orId countries.
The presentation by Kim Forss aimed at darifying some of the concepts - that are
of ten used and sometimes confused. He maintained that institutional cooperation is
one variable that may influence organisational change. Organisations cooperate
because they wish to change in one way or another. Institutional development,
however, is a broader concept. It is an end in itself, because institutional development
means development. Joint ventures, twinning and other forms of institutional
cooperation are therefore potential tools through which organisations cooperate, for
the purpose of achieving organisational change, and consequently institutional
development.
Forss also warned that organisational change is a hard phenomenon to grasp:
Organisational change is non-linear, it normally occurs as qualitative leaps, and it
of ten occurs as a consequence of duster effects of many factors playing together.
Organisational change is therefore hard to plan, and difficult to promote by planned
institutional cooperation. A deeper understanding of organisational change is
necessary in order to lower expectations, understand the challenges, and find workable
solutions.
One important precondition for institutional cooperation is that each organisation is
aware of the motivations and expectations of the other partner. In broad terms, there
are two main types of organisations: the reflective, analytical organisation; and the
action-oriented organisation. While private firms and most NGOs are much more like
action organisations, aid ageneies tend to be more reflective. Meanwhile, in order to
change, organisations also have to learn. Learning within an organisation requires a
healthy balanee between stability, order and structure on the one side, and wilingness
to look for flexibility, change proeesses and bottom-up initiatives on the other. In most
cases there is a need for more of the latter; more chaos and less order, in order to
promote learning and organisational change. But it is a practical managerial challenge
to develop a complexity that allows organisations to re ap the benefits of both order
and chaos. And it is a challenge for funding ageneies to encourage more complex
structures to emerge, according to Forss.
The importanee of the right context with well-chosen and briefed partners who are
motivated for mutual learning, was also underIined in the presentation by Peter Blunt.
Based on case studies of institutional twinning arrangements from Laos, Sweden and
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Namibia, as well as other empirical and theoretical material, he argued that such
cooperation has to be predicated on clearly defined notions of sustainability and
institution hui/ding. The term institution building usually embraces programmes of
constructive change in single organisations (or clusters of organisations) and is
designed to improve their performance and capacity to develop new capacities
independently: that is, their ability to learn from, and adapt to, their environments.
The term may also be used to refer to the strengthening of the broa der mechanisms, or
institutions, which regulate societies and economies, but the two meanings of
institutions should not be confused.
A twinning arrangement would then involve a partnership between organisations with
similar remits, i.e. similarities of corporate identity and institutional mandates, with
the purpose of promoting organisational change and institution building in the South.
Such arrangements are of ten motivated by problems with regular technical assistance,
and a desire to influence whole organisations, not just individuals within an
organisation, and are further justified by a num ber of perceived strengths and benefits
to both organisations. However, learning organisations are rare anywhere, even where
the ideological and resource circumstances are ideal, and many of the ideal
assumptions about perceived strengths and mutual benefits are not achieved in reality.
Successful organisational cooperation will therefore require careful preparation and
selection of potential partners, as well as thorough assessment of the macro and micro
environments within which cooperation is to take place. It is equally important,
according to Blunt, that there is a shared understanding of organisation and institution
building, and the expected nature and duration of the relationship between the two
organisations. But most of all, shared responsibility for learning and for achieving the
agreed outcome is a pre-requisite. In this respect, Blunt confirmed the importanee of a
shared ownership, which was so forcefully introduced by Professor Sobhan.
Three case studies: Main results, constraints and difficulties
In order to highlight lessons learned, results obtained and constraints experienced by
the practitioners themselves, three case experiences were presented by those directly
involved in the respective cases:
aj Institutional twinning moving beyond technical assistance
The institutional twinning arrangement between the National Directorate of Coal and
Hydrocarbons (DNCH) in Mozambique and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(NPD) had been actively implemented only since 1997, but the Norwegian aid agency
NORAD had previously funded technical assistance to DNCH, partly through NPD.
The twinning agreement confirmed a more long-term and stable relationship, while
increasing the level and expanding the types of assistance. However, the cooperation
had retained most of the characteristics of a technical assistance project.
Establishing an institutional relationship, rather than receiving technical assistance
organised through an aid agency, was nevertheless seen as positive. Direct cooperation
with a competent sister agency was found to be a more effective mechanism for
transfer of knowledge and experience. In particular, DNCH could also benefit from
3
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on-the-job training inside NPD, and the institutional relationship gave more easy
access to high quality consultants inside as well as outside NPD.
The main negative factor was seen as a risk that dependenee on the twinned partner
might slow down capacity building inside DNCH. There was also a concern that
DNCH was sometimes seen in Mozambique as being unduly influenced or even
controlled by a foreign organisation.
Concerning the overall agreement, both DNCH and NPD recommended that the
roles of all parties should be defined more clearly, and that this was the responsibility
of NORAD as a funding agency and promoter of the institutional arrangement. They
were also concerned that the three-year duration of the agreement was much toa short
for this type of agreement to develop a good working relationship, especially since it
included support in legal and regulatory matters.
b) Supporting an organisational change process
The institutional twinning experience of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS),
supported through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) was quite different. It was presente d as a case where a felt need within
the ERCS for organisational change was supported through a number of twinning
partnerships. In post-famine Ethiopia of the mid-1980s, the ERCS acknowledged the
shortcomings of just providing life-saving support to famine victims and decided on a
change proeess giving emphasis to promoting increased food security and strengthened
local communities. This would require a comprehensive decentralisation within the
ERCS. In order to promote and support this change proeess, some 20 twinning
partnerships were established between local branches of the ERCS and branches of
sister National Societies in the North.
The ERCS regards these local branch twinning partnerships as very successful in
promoting strong direct people-to-people contacts which enhance cross-cultural
learning and international understanding. More importantly, "the institutional and
community capacity building experience gained from the twinning partnership, is one
of the factors that has infused the (clamour) for change and development within the
ERCS focusing on decentralisation, self-reliance, and grassroots level development",
according to their own assessment. In short, it is claimed that with full ownership
within the ERCS, the twinning arrangements infused and encouraged a fundamental
change proeess within the organisation.
The main risks as se en by the ERCS, are that the youth involved in exchange visits
with sister red cross societies in the North, sometimes refuse to return at the end of
their stay. Secondly, it has been difficult to ensure a fair distribution of benefits from
the twinning arrangements among all branches of the organisation. And thirdly, exit
strategies for the support programmes were not clearly spelled out at the point of
entry.
But in the view of the ERCS, the main value of the twinning partnerships is the
proeess of cross-cultural learning and international understanding, as a conduit for
increasing knowledge and insight. This should be seen as "a dynamic and eternal
relationship with no terminal point in time and spaee" .
c) Institution building and community relationships
The third case presented the municipal partnership programme between the city of
Portage la Prairie in Canada, and the rural island municipality of Tubigon in the
4
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Philippines. This could be seen as a combination of a friendship programme for the
municipalities, and a programme of support for capacity building in Tubigon. This
municipal partnership programme is organised and promoted through the Federation
of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), and funded by the Canadian aid agency Cida. The
two partners agreed that both aspects of the programme were very successfuL.
The success was based on the implementation of two programrnes for capacity
building - for developing strategic planning for the municipality and in computerising
the municipal waterworks system - and even more important the involvement of the
communities at large in establishing lasting contacts and friendship programmes
between the two partners. According to their own assessment, there had been no real
problems encountered, except for difficult communication due to poor telephone lines.
In Tubigon, however, the number of qualified staff who can work effectively in a
foreign environment is quite limited.
The collaborative programme between Portage la Prairie and Tubigon had the
benefit of being developed within a well-defined programme under the FCM, with
relatively clear roles and expectations. Cooperation was facilitated by the realisation,
thanks to the twinning arrangement, that the two municipal administrations and city
councils were dealing with similar problems, in different settings. Sufficient time was
invested in the initial phases, to get to know each other and establish a working
relationship. But most of the success depended on the very positive personal
relationships established between the principal representatives of the two
municipalities and those responsible for the programrne.
The three case studies illustrate and highlight findings in the major evaluation of
"Development through institutions" commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and published in 1998.1 In particular, the sub-study on twinning
arrangements for institutional cooperation between public institutions in Norway and
the South, found that the institutions involved were generally positive towards the
institutional development projects in which they were directly involved, despite
conceptual confusion and unclear distribution of roles and responsibilities.
In Norway, institutional cooperation (twinning) is one of several aid strategies to
promote institution bu ilding. The idea is to provide the recipient in the South with a
broad range of competence and services through a sister institution with a comparable
institutional mandate. However, while these arrangements are relative ly successful in
providing transfers of relevant skilIs and training, the effects on organisational change
are less evident. As summarised in the evaluation report, most of the Norwegian
institutions possess considerable professional competence, but they are not equally
strong in pursuing Norwegian development goals and the broader objectives of
institutional development. Likewise, the capacities of the southern institutions to
absorb and use the human and technical resources accessible through twinning
agreements varied. And some of them were sceptical towards including broader
concerns such as organisational change, management and relations with external
stakeholders.
Development through institutions? Sub-studies 1-4 and Synthesis Report (various authors). Oslo:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998. Evaluation Reports 1-5.98.
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Lessons and recommendations
The following lessons and recommendations may be summarised on the basis of the
deliberations during the seminar:
The term "institutional twinning" has of ten been misused
. Institutional twinning has of ten been used to describe arrangements similar to
classical technical assistance projects. Contracting an institutional collaboration
does not signify a real partnership, unless an explicit effort is made to change and
create a more balanced kind of relationship.
. Twinning may therefore not be a useful concept, because the meaning and
implications are unclear. We may rather speak of institutional or organisational
cooperation with a clear statement of the nature of cooperation intended. A
"partnership" is even more elusive, and is being used with reference to a wide
variety of relationships including donors and recipients, and all kinds of
institutions who are development partners.
A real institutional cooperation requires ownership, mutual benefits, and a minimum
leve! of institutional capacity
. The concepts of partnership and twinning between similar institutions in the North
and the South carry a notion of relative equality among the partners, at least in
terms of setting the agenda, defining priorities, and controlling the funds available.
This is possible where both partners share the ownership of the arrangement.
However, this requires a minimum level of institutional capacity on both sides at
the outset of defining the partnership agreement.
. Real ownership is developed when both institutions share perspectives on needs
and priorities, and jointly participate in seleeting methodology and approach. This
requires an environment of mutual respect, trust, transparency and dialogue,
aiming at shared visions and responsibilities. The southern partner has to be
involved in seleeting its northern partner, and in sharing controlover utilisation of
available funding. But also the northern partner needs an incentive beyond the
basic funding of a contractual arrangement, to evolve a feeling of ownership. This
is possible when there are potential professional benefits, positive personal
relationships, or shared ideal objectives (especially for NGOs).
. Several internal factors will nurture positive partner collaboration: Both partners
will have to identify and clarify their needs and expectations. Both partners need a
legitimate self-interest in the relationship. All partners have to be prepared to
change and adapt, since no relationship is perfeet. Mutual cultural understand ing is
required, and this may take time to mature. Personal relationships may have to be
developed over time. And there has to be areasonable balanee between concrete
plans and flexibility.
. Institutional twinning on a real partnership basis is therefore only possible for more
mature relationships, with a minimum level of institutional capacIty on both sides.
There is full agreement that more responsibility has to be carried by the southern
partner, and that donors and other partners have to encourage such a transfer of
6
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responsibilities. However, a feeling of ownership cannot be created from outside -
that would be a contradietion in terms.
. It has of ten been found that southern partners view capacity building primarily in
terms of transfers of technical skils, equipment, and opportunities for further
training. The northern partners may more of ten see the need for organisational
change as a basic requirement. Such discrepancies need to be addressed by mutual
consent in order to clarify the needs, priorities, and objectives in the agreement,
rather than formulated as a condition by the northern partner or donor agency.
N eed for a two-step strategy: Creating initial capacity through regular technical
assistance
. In many cases, southern institutions lack the capacity to cooperate on equal
professional terms with their partners in the North. This may easily reduce
ownership in the South by making the programme for cooperation a northern
agenda. The southern partners may not even be able to define their own needs, let
alone the relevant inputs and other requirements. It is important, however, that an
assessment is done through dialogue and consensus building.
. Opportunities may have to be created for a southern institution to ga in sufficient
capacity and self-knowledge to enter into an institutional collaboration
arrangement. This may require time and effort to mobilise domestie resources as a
basic platform. Donors may have to hold back until the appropriate time for new
initiatives. A programme to support capacity building for the southern institution
wil then necessarily take the form of conventional technical assistance, even if
implemented through an agreement with a northern institution with a similar
professional function.
. When ownership and shared visions are laeking, other incentives easily become
predominant for both partners. For the southern partner, the interest in an
institutional arrangement wil depend on available alternatives, in order to obtain
resources especially equipment, training, or other opportunities. For a northern
partner the opportunities for economic or professional benefits may easily
dominate the relationship.
Alternatives have to be considered
. Institutional cooperation and twinning arrangements are only some of several tools
in the kit bag for support to capacity building and organisational change. All those
involved, in particular the southern partner, need to make a conscious choIce of
whether to make use of local or regional consultants, regular technical assistance,
or an institutional twinning arrangement. It is not possible today to give precise
guidelines as to when one form is preferable to another, and more research may be
useful to determine the appropriate circumstances.
. Networking among similar organisations in the South - as well as in the North - is
fast becoming another alternative for organisations that need advise, sharing
experiences and learning, and for sourcing available resources. The scope for
networking has been greatly expanded through access to the Internet, and should
7
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be considered an alternative - or complementary - to institutional collaboration on
a one-ta-one basis.
. The southern institutions lay heavy emphasis on opting for local, national or
regional solutions where possible. Even within an organisational collaboration,
resources and solutions to problems should be searched in the region.
Organisational change depends on an enabling environment - but influencing political
conditions requires different approaches
. Organisational change in many cases requires larger reforms in the institutional
environment - such as attitudes towards change, privatisation or decentralisation,
specific regulatory legislation. The enabling environment for institutional change
might even indude political conditions, democracy, transparency, rule of law, and
local government.
. Partnership and twinning arrangements seldom aim at changing these wider
institutional conditions. Most programmes aim at capacity building or
organisational change within a given environment. Experience has shown,
however, that support to specific organisations in some cases has been conducive to
initiating broa der institutional changes for privatisation orsimilar reforms.
. The general less on, however, is that it is not the responsibility of a partnership
arrangement to initiate broader policy changes. This is rather the responsibility of
national institutions and donors in volve d at sectoral level or in the dialogue on
national development policies. But while some donors are of ten involved in
dialogues on sectoral policies, macro policies and other aspects of the institutional
environment, other (smaller) donors have less experience of how to conduct such
dialogues.
. The. lack of an enabling environment may impinge upon the outcome of a
programme for capacity building and organisational change. One commonly cited
example is where trained sta ff lea ve the organisation for better salaries and
opportunities elsewhere. In other cases, the organisation will not be able to achieve
its higher level of efficiency because of its dependenee of external factors (and
actors) that are not sufficiently conducive and supportive.
. An institutional twinning programme should be seen as part of a broader country
strategy and sectoral strategi es for the donors and their national counterparts. The
level of political support, or acceptance, will have a strong impact on the outcome
of a collaborative venture. The interests and behaviour of other stakeholders are
also of great relevance.
The ro le of the donor should be distinguished from that of the northern partner
. Most participants agreed that the donor (funding) agency has a separate role from
that of the northern partner. But as long as the northern institution controls the
funding, it is of ten perceived as being part of - or very dose to - the donor agency.
The "NORAD model" for public institutions provides for a funding agreement
between the donor agency and a southern partner, which then becomes responsible
8
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for a contractual arrangement with a northern partner. This type of arrangement
has been proven possible.
. The donor agency has a responsibility for guiding a reasonable exit strategy and for
transferring the responsibilities for long-term maintenanee of equipment and other
items of sustainability.
. However, little or nothing was sa id about the role of the central government in the
South. While negotiating technical and other assistance with donor ageneies, the
central government may influence the decisions regarding collaborative arrange-
ments and the conditions guiding their implementation.
The final paradox: when organisational change is non-linear
. In the debate on organisational change, capacity building, and institutional
collaboration it may ever so of ten be useful to be reminded that organisations have
a purpose. The objective is not organisational change per se, but promotion of the
larger development issues. Within the parameters of these development objectives,
however, the organisations and the wider institutional contexts of ten have to
change to become more effective, more relevant, increase their capacity, and thus
promote their goals more efficiently.
. The participants largely agreed that organisational development is non-linear, and
happ ens in leaps and bounds. It is difficult, however, to spell out the full
implications of this insight: We may have to be more patient. We may have to
promote organisational development and capacity building from a more multi-
pronged approach. But we may still have difficulties in achieving - and measuring -
gains and progress, until there is a real break-through in the change proeess.
9
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Re-assessing aid: The role of governance,
institution building and partnership: Learning from
the Asian experience
REHMAN SOBHAN, CHAIRMAN, CENTRE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE, DHAKA
Introduction
Scope of this paper
Foreign aid known as official development assistance (ODA) is in a state of crisis. Its
share of total capital transfers is in decline in the 1990s as private capital flows have
emerged as the dominant source of capital transfers to thedeveloping countries (DC).
This has severely aggravated inequities in the access among DCs to external resource
flows. These inequities in total capita L flows to the DCs are being compounded by the
inequities in ODA transfer to the DCs. Instead of aDA playing a compensatory role to
correct imbalances in private flows, in 1998, the World Bank directed 57% of its aid
disbursements to just 4 upper middle income countries whilst the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) directed 43% of its loans to 2 countries, Republic of Korea (ROK) and
Thailand. These multilateral funds went in as part of the rescue opera ti on for private
banks involved in the East Asian financial crisis. Under the circumstances both the
logic as well as outcomes of aid are increasingly under question which is
compromising the sustainability of aid budgets in virtually every donor country. Issues
about the direction of aid, the policy regimes along with attendant conditionalities
associated with its delivery and the impact both on economic performanee as well as
the state of governanee in aid recipient countries is feeding this sense of disillusion
with aid.
This paper is designe d to review the de bate on aid effectiveness in the specific context
of the Asian experience with aid. The paper argues that the effectiveness of aid lies in
the crisis of governanee which has overtaken many DC's. This crisis in governanee is
not limited to the DCs but extends into the donor ageneies themselves, particularly the
multilateral bodies. But this paper wil limit itself to the crisis in the DCs since donor
governanee merits independent study. The crisis in the DCs is perpetuated by the
increasing loss of ownership over their policyagendas during a decade of donor driven
policy reform and under pressures from the proeess of globalisation. This loss of
ownership has led to the deaccumulation of domestie institutional capacity and
eventually the delegitimisation of the state which has further aggravated the crisis of
governanee in many DCs and in what are today terme d the transitional economies
(TEs) of Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
Any attempt to improve the effectiveness of aid lies in a complete rethinking of not just
the policy agenda's associated with aid but in the need to restore ownership to the aid
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recipients over the design of domestie policy. To restore ownership over policy needs
to take account of the nature of the aid relationship as it impinges on the political
economy of the DCs, the consequential development of their institutionsand the
specificity of their institutional links with the donor countries. The building of
institutional partnerships between the DCs and the developed countries will thus need
to take account of the state of the prevailing aid relationship between the particular
DC and its aid donors.
Evolving perspectives on aid
The philosophy of aid
The issue of aid effectiveness reaches well beyond the academic domain because of the
large stakes involved. Nearly a trilion dollars have been invested in aid. The yardstick
for assessing aid effectiveness has varied with the era. But the most contemporary
measure of aid effectiveness poses the question 'How can development assistance be
most effective at reducing global poverty?' That this question is posed after half a
century of development assistance remains a measure of the prevailing disquiet with
the outcomes of the aid proeess. The use of the metric of poverty is inspired by the
nature of the appeal to those who finanee aid, the citizens, largely in the role of tax
payers, of the advanced industrial countries (AIC). Whilst some of the governments of
aid giving countries may have once been driven by the realpolitik of keeping the Third
World safe from communism the appeal for aid largely originated in the humanitarian
concerns of the average taxpayers of the developed world. Appeals to their sen se of
appreciation of the geopolitics of the cold war counted for less than their genuine
concern to help deprived people. Arguments by the political 'right' about the follies of
helping the undeserving who were poor because of their moral and political
inadequacies cut no more ice than did their critiques of the welfare state in Europe.
The United States, which had escaped the losses of World War Il had already
established its willingness to use its enormous wealth to finanee the recovery of Europe
and its citizens now appeared ready to share their bo unt Y with the poor of the Third
World. In my memory neither Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson faced any
political problems in obtaining votes in Congress for a rising aid bilL.
However, in appealing to the moral sense of the citizens of the developed world an
image was projected to the voters of the respective donor governments disbursing aid
to feed hungry peasants in the Third World, to improve the lives of children begging at
the traffic intersections of Bombay, Rio de Janeiro and Lagos in order to sustain their
families living in the squalid shantytowns of these metropolitan centres. This image of
the Third World poor, if somewhat overdrawn, undifferentiated and simplistic was at
that time broadly accurate and did persuade people that their dollars, pounds, franes
and marks would contribute to giving the poor a better life. The need for such aid was
always projected as finite. Effective use of aid was designed to bridge the
savings/investment gap and the balanee of payments gap in the DCs and put them on
the path to self-sustaining development.
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The disilusion with aid
Both the nature of the appeal and the promises of how such taxes would be put to
work sugge sted that a quarter of a century later the street children would be in school,
immunised against endemic disease, their parents would live in habitations service d by
safe drinking water, sanitary toilets, durable homesteads, maintained through new
work opportunities which provided at least for the basic needs of the family. It was
assumed that peasants would till their own land, improve farm productivity and access
earning opportunities in off-farm employment to a point where rural poverty would be
a concern of a former age. By the 1980's there was a legitimate expectation on the part
of the taxpayers that substantial numbers of the Third World's poor would no longer
be poor and consequently the daims on the taxpayers of the AIC would be much less.
They were thus quite unprepared to be assailed by TV images of the rave/as of Rio, the
shantytowns of Nairobi and the bustees of Calcutta and Dhaka. They did not want to
be exposed to images of emacIated peasants and £lood devastated households. More to
the point they did not appreciate the fact that these rave/as co-existed with the luxury
apartment blocs of Sao Paolo, inhabited by a dass who shopped in Paris or New York
and even imported their boutiques to Sao Paolo and drove air-conditioned Mercedes
600 cars. Nor did they want to hear about the fortunes accumulated abroad by Third
World leaders.
The deep disilusion with three decades of development assistance thus lies both in the
persistenee of poverty and its juxtaposition with the affuence of the few in many
Third World countries. Aid ageneies who had to extract dollars from angry legislators
to sustain their bilateral aid programmes and replenish the capital base of the World
Bank were increasingly hard put to justify this persistenee of endemic poverty in many
Third World countries. The origins of policy lending and the subsequent rediscovery of
governanee as the critical component of successful aid programmes, it is argued,
originated in the need to justify what was deemed by AIC tax payers as a massive
misuse of their hard-earned money and the apparent deception practised by the aid
ageneies implicit in the appeals to their conscience. This demand by tax payers in the
AICs for visible returns from their aid budgets was itself the byproduct of a political
dimate which was becoming progressively more hostile to increasing taxation and
public expenditures. In this milieu cuts in the aid budget appeared as politically low
cost measures since DC aid recipients do not vote in AIC elections.
The era of policy reforms
This concern with the disilusion of Northern tax payers was itself conditioned by the
apparent complicity of the aid ageneies of the donors in contributing to this
misdirection as well as misuse of aid and their collusive ro le in building up a dass of
people who prospered from aid at the expense of the majority of the DC citizens. The
response of aid agencIes in the AICs to this rising sen se of outrage in the donor
countries was thus driven both by the expectation that this disillusion with aid could
be reversed as well as by their compulsions for institutional survivaL. Aid ageneies,
seeking to protect their budgets focussed on two themes in seeking to redesign aid
strategies:
(i) Getting policies right.
(ii) Redireeting aid to the poor.
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The second part was however largely subordinated to the first because it was believed
by the dominant aid donors through the decade of the 1980s that the right policies
would stimulate growth which in turn would alleviate poverty. In order to get policies
right aid was increasingly offered on conditional terms that policy reforms, on lines
suggested by the donors, would be put in place in the respective DCs. This agenda for
policy reform was, in turn, heavily influenced by the ideological input emanating from
the Reagan and Thatcher administrations which underwrote the so called Washington
Consensus. In country after country, the World Bank and IMF, known collectively as
the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI), put in place stabilisation programmes followed
by a package of structural adjustment reforms (SAR) inspired by the Washington
Consensus. Upto $75 billion was invested in SAR programmes through the 1980's.
It was, with some distinguished exceptions in the DCs and TEs, the apparent failure
of the aid driven reforms of the 1980's to either promote sustained growthor alleviate
poverty which has now inspired a further change of direction in donor aid strategies.
The sense of frustration amongst the taxpayers of the north had by now extended
from the 'right' to the 'left' led by the NGOs, radical academics and church groups.
The critics projected the 1980's as an era of failed reforms, which not only did not
improve growth but made a small fraction of these Third World countries very rich
whilst the poor remained poor. The 'right' continued to challenge the very
assumptions of aid and remained unimpressed by the decade of reforms initiated in
many developing countries under the leadership of the BWI. The strong resistance in
the US Congress to the capital replenishment of the World Bank, the regional banks
such as the ADB and more recently the IMF, suggests that the reformist zeal of the aid
agencies has failed to impress the Jesse Helmsand Newt Gingrichs of the US political
establishment.
Putting governanee first
To cope with critics from both the 'left' and 'right' the new focus on aid strategy
appears to be directed to getting governance right and targetting aid to the poor
through what James Wolfensohn, the incumbent President of the World Bank, terms
the challenge of inclusion. The literature of the World Bank in the 1990s indicates that
the World Bank, at lea st, has recognised that a combination of getting policies and
governanee right is likely to alleviate poverty. Their most recent empirical work on
Assessing Aid claims that 'with' sound country management (italics mine) 1 % of GDP
in assistance translates into 1 % decline in poverty. Thus, it states that a $ 10 bilion
increase in aid would lift 25 milion people a year out of poverty - but only if it
favours countries with sound economic management (italics mine). By contrast, the
Bank paper argues that an across the board increase of $ 10 billion would lift on ly 7
milion out of their hand to mouth existence if economic management was weak.
This World Bank study goes on to argue that 'improvements in economic institutions
and policies in the developing world are the key to a quantum leap in poverty
reduction'. Such effective use of aid is also seen to complement private investment.
Promoting aid effectiveness thus demands the use of aid in strengthening institutions as
well as policies and bringing about an active engagement of civil society in the design
and delivery of aid. These conclusions of the World Bank study are apparently derived
from intensive empirical work on aid effectiveness based on reviewing a large sample
of DCs and aid projects.
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In this paper there is no scope for ad dressing the design, methodology and data used in
the World Bank study. There appear to be a number of serious flaws in the
assumptions as well as design of the analytical model used in the study whilst their
empirical evidence merits more careful scrutiny. The original definition of sound
management incorporates a mix of three policies: reducing the budget surplus as well
as the rate of inflation and realising increased trade openness. These reforms are
packaged with institutional quality which is itself defined as an admixture of strength
of the rule of law, quality of the public bureaucracy and pervasiveness of corruption. It
would be necessary to examine the metric for such abstract concepts as rule of law and
bureaucratie quality before assessing the weights assigned to the se four variables and
three sub-variables of institutional quality. Such an exercise would permit a fuller
appreciation of the empirical work correlating GDP growth with economic policy and
institutional quality. It wil, however, be argued that the available evidence from the
Asian experience does not conclusively support the conclusions of the World Bank
study on the ro le of governance.
Notwithstanding its technical limitations The World Bank study on Assessing Aid is an
important document. Its currency and extent of analysis on aid effectiveness and the
attempt to use empirical evidence to question the efficacy of a decade of donor driven
policy reforms underwritten by conditional offers of ODA, makes it a landmark
document. The study appears to reflect a wilingness of the World Bank to encourage a
more endogenous proeess of promoting policy reforms within the Third World. This
rethinking in the World Bank is further reaffirmed by the series of conferences
organised by the World Bank around the world addressing the issue of policy
ownership as a critical ingredient in any move to promote better governance.
This rethinking of aid policy is not limited to the World Bank. Other aid donors such
as the U.K., the Nordics countries, and the Netherlands are also seeking to link good
governanee with aid effectiveness and are arguing that policy ownership is crucial to
the exercise of effective governanee over development policy in the developing
countries. All such agendas to promote governanee reform focus on the need to
prioritise the poor in the donor's allocative regimes. But such poverty alleviating
agendas are now increasingly concerned with issues of empowerment of the poor and
of women as integral to the proeess of poverty alleviation. In the remainder of this
paper we wil attempt to address the impact of this rethinking about aid in the donor
community on improving aid effectiveness in the specific context of Asia's experience
with aid. We wil conclude by discussing whether more innovative initiatives involving
institutional linkages between developed and developing countries can reconcile some
of the prevailing tensions between policy ownership, good governanee and aid
effectiveness.
Contradietions in the World Bank's new aid strategy
Bank programmes designe d in an era when growth was prioritised over poverty have
not quite worked out how poverty alleviation wil be integrated into the earlier
generation of SAR programmes. The belief of the 1980s that high growth wil reduce
poverty may be something of a truism. However, the earlier reforms neither generated
growth nor alleviated poverty so that a new development model to reconcile growth
with poverty alleviation is stil awaited. The current practise of simply adding on
poverty related projects to the old adjustment model appears to be a self-defeating
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exercise. If the original development design was itself perpetuating poverty,
accentuating inequalities and empowering a small elite who use their wealth to
monopolise state power, a few so called poverty centred projects will not ensure a
sustainable assault on poverty or the empowerment of the pOOL Prioritisation of
poverty in the aid agenda thus demands that the original design of the reform proeess
has to incorporate institutional mechanisms for ensuring inclusion of the poor in the
development proeess, giving them competitive access to the market and
institutionalised claims on resources, and scope for participating in political power.
Attempts to step up allocations for the poor through targetted aid programmes of
micro-credit or allocations for primary health care centres is hardly likely to disturb
the realities of power in most DCs and TES.
Serious contradietions also appear to arise between the prioritisation of governanee in
aid agendas and the BWI commitment to policy lending. The distorting impact of
policy lending derives from its impact on policy ownership as well as the limited access
of the poor to the benefits of such reforms. It has been recognised by all donors from
the World Bank to DFID's new White Paper, that reforms without ownership have
prove d to be unsustainable. It would thus appear that the newthink on aid has not
really resolved the tension between the flawed policy design and the Bank's new
commitment to putting governanee first. The World Bank has in fact not succeeded in
developing a coherent model which links such reforms with their original policy
design. Nor is there any indication that policy ownership in the DCs is being more
actively promoted rather than talked about.
This focus by the World Bank on good governanee is itself at least a decade old. But
this new report on Assessing Aid is the first that gives governanee reforms priority over
policy reforms. The Bank has recognised that reforms only work in an environment
where good governanee prevails. The report moves on to argue that efforts to buy
policy improvements through conditional loans to countries where there is no
movement for reforms, have typically failed. Furthermore, redirection of aid towards
poverty alleviation, prima ry education and health care cannot be effective without
improving the quality of service delivery through strengthening local and sectoral
institutions. Assessing Aid goes on to highlight the importanee of the participatory
approach to programme design and service delivery and the important role of civil
society in promoting such a participatory approach to development. It has less to say
on how participation of the poor is to be managed in local communities where power
and resources are monopolised by an elite or how to build civil society through the
patronage of aid donors.
All such arguments about the counter-productive nature of donor driven policy
reforms have been part of the critique of foreign aid and external dependenee for at
least two decades and particularly during the hightide of adjustment reforms in the
1980s. For the academics, NGOs and some political parties who had been challenging
the donor driven reform proeess of the 1980s, it is welcome news that the World Bank
has seen the light. Empirical research is now deployed by the Bank to demonstrate that
lack of policy ownership contributes to the failure of reforms. They could have learnt
as much by a careful reading of writings on the subject published in the 1980s. The
problem with this rethinking within the World Bank lies in their assessment of how the
donors should redirect their aid strategies. It is proposed to address the Bank's
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rethinking within the specific historical experience with aid and reforms in East and
South Asia.
The Bank has identified sound management as a composite of: good economic policy,
and institutional quality. According to the Bank study measures of good policy and
institutional quality correlate positive ly with rates of GDP growth. The Bank study
does not indicate if these measures of sound management correlate as positively with
poverty trends, human development and distribution of income which are today as
high on the agenda of donors as was economic growth in the 1980's. This peculiar
selection of economic growth as the dependent variable in the model already exposes
the contradietions in the newthink of the World Bank, as between governanee and
poverty. Thus without exploring the merits of this particular index developed by the
World Bank, of weightage between policy and institutions, or the ways in which
numbers were assigned to these particular variables, we wil brie fly overview the
relevanee of these indicators for Asia.
Good governanee and developmental success: An Asian
perspective
Sound economic policies
The available evidence from Asia indicates that by the standards set by the World
Bank Asia's policy regimes remains reasonably sound. Thus, in Asia budget deficits in
relation to GDP were low through the 1980's at lea st by DC standards. During the
1990s very few Asian countries ran deficits in excess of 10%. In East/SE Asia, apart
from Cambodia and Lao PDR, few countries ran deficits in excess of 5%.
Significantly, the highest budget deficits in this area were incurred by Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan province.
The South Asian countries had high er deficit/GNP ratios than those in East/SE Asia
but, with the exception of the Maldives, this deficit never exceeded 10%. The larger
deficits in South Asia were designed to accommodate inflows of aid. These budget
deficits were not the result of governmental extravagance but part of a structural
problem originating in the proeess of high aid dependency. To draw any conclusion, at
least within Asia, about the relative policy merits of the debt/GDP ratio would thus
appear to be misleading. Today, East Asia's high ly favourable budgetary balanee has
not spared it from the pressure of the IMF's demand for greater budgetary austerity in
order to scope with their prevailing financial crisis.
All Asian countries have, again by global standards, enjoyed low rates of inflation,
mostly in single digits. Exceptions have been PRC (1993-95), Myanmar (1992-96),
Vietnam (1992-95), India (1987, 1994-95), Sri Lanka (1992-95). In most such cases
inflation rates were within 15% and soon came down to single digit leveis. High rates
of growth, as in People's Republic of China (PRC) and Viet Nam, have of ten
contributed to inflationary pressure. Conversely, low inflation, at least in Asia, could
also indicate that not much is happening in the economy. This inflationary pressure
originates again in structural bottleneeks rather than monetary policy where most
Asian countries have tended to be rather conservative.
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Trade openness as a measure of policy merit is more problematic. No doubt the East
Asians and South East Asian were strongly export oriented and this was an important
factor in ensuring their global competitiveness and driving their growth. However,
there is an ongoing debate on the covert protectionism practised by ROK until well
into the 1980s and continues to be practised today in Japan. It is argued that a policy
of domestie protection appears to have co-existed with considerable policy support for
exports throughout the decades of high export growth in several East Asian countries
from 1965 to 1985. Many of these export promotion measures through the 1960's
and 1970's were not very consistent with the tenets of economic liberalisation and
would be deemed today as unacceptable by the WTO. Even the South East Asian's
protected some key part of their economy and nurtured these for entry into the export
mark et, as for example the case of the Proton car in Malaysia. PRC and Viet Nam,
who have been enjoying high rates of GDP and export growth over the last 15 years,
for all their reforms, remain even today more protected economies than any in South
Asia.
Conversely Bangladesh and Nepal's opening up of the economy has not yet yielded the
benefits promised by economic reformers. These arguments could be applied even
more strongly to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) wheremany countries have liberalised their
import regimes at the cost of a deterioration in domestie industry and the ushering in
of a proeess of de-industrialisation. It is thus arguable that open economic policies may
be a necessary but far from sufficient condition to stimulate growth. The correlation
between policy and outcomes needs to be made country specific if we are to draw any
policy condusions as has been the practise in the W orId Bank 1 s report on Assessing
Aid.
Measures of institutional quality
The link between institutional quality and growth in Asia is far more problematic.
Measuring the strength of the rule of law is as difficult as the comparative measure of
corruption, introduced by Transparency International. It is thus difficult to assess
whether, for example, the rule of law in Thailand was better established than in
Bangladesh, in order to explain their consistently higher growth rates. No doubt what
passes for the rule of law was more in evidence in Malaysia than in Zaire. But for this
proposition to hold good it must also explain differential performanee within Asia
itself.
As far as corruption is concerned, there is no evidence at hand which would indicate
that Indonesia was more or less corrupt than Bangladesh or even Thailand. Indeed
countries such as China, ROK, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam which
rank quite unfavourably in the lists of Transparency International, have performed
exceedingly well in the last two decades. Thus some writers have talked of the rule
based corruption of East Asia compared to the more anarchic corruption of South Asia
which of ten fails to deliver services promised to the bribe givers. Evidence of such
differentiated modes of corruption is at best aneedotal and sounds less plausible today
after the revelations about Indonesia.
In the wake of the financial crisis in East Asia the re are attempts to relate the
corruption of Indonesia, Thailand and ROK to their current problems. But reports of
corruption in the se countries is hardly new and was very much in evidence during their
17
C M I
miracle period. It is thus far from clear if much can be made out of this index, at lea st
as a measure of either economic performanee or sound economic management.
As far as a comparative assessment of bureaucratie quality is concerned it is not clear
what measures are used for this by the Bank. Again, it wouldbe difficult to argue that
India or Sri Lanka's bureaucracy is less competent than that of Thailand, Indonesia,
China or Vietnam as to qualifications, systems of recruitment and career advaneement.
Bureaucratie quality thus appears to be measured by economic performance and can
hardly serve as an explanatory variable for this economic performance. It could thus
be argued that the East Asian bureaucracy, compared to that in Francophone Africa,
may, on aneedotal evidence, look more meritorious but within Asia the application of
these measures in assessing economic performance would need to be much more
sensitively analysed to permit for any conclusions to be drawn.
The media response to the East Asian crisis indeed suggests that many of the features
of weak governanee once associated with South Asia and even Sub-Saharan Africa
such as corruption, cronyism, political patronisation, lack of transparency, lack of rule
of law, personalised regulatory practises, are alive and well in East Asia and are only
today being identified as explanations for their current financial crisis. But these flaws
in governanee were also present in the East Asian system during its miracle phase
when few donors sought to highlight these as constraints to their economic
performance. It would thus appear that whilst the World Bank's position on the value
of sound governanee appears to be intuitively acceptable more robust evidence, within
Asia at lea st, needs to be generated before we can use these measures as a yardstick for
guiding aid policy.
The follow up arguments posed by the World Bank for re due ing poverty thus also
needs to rest on more robust evidence establishing the causal link between sound
economic management and policy success. Unfortunately, the conceptual link between
governanee and economic performance remains far from clear. In these circumstances,
the recommendation that aid be targetted to low income countries with sound
economic management appears to be sensible in principle but difficult to
operationalise. Obviously PRC has fared much better than India whilst Viet Nam has
done better than Bangladesh in re due ing poverty. But whether this owes to their policy
and allocative priorities, their better economic management or stronger political
commitment, remains again open to debate.
The World Bank study makes the sensible point that experiences shows that donor
(inancing with strong conditionally but without strong domestie leadership and
political support has generally (ailed to produce lasting change (italics mine). This
statement could certainly be written as an epitaph on the era of conditional aid offered
to South Asia (bar India) and the Philippines in the 1980's. There is no evidence that
any of these countries made strong political commitments to economic reforms or
sought to build a political constituency behind their economic reforms. Even in India
the strong commitment demonstrated by Dr. Manmohan Singh to economic reforms,
when he took over as Finanee Minister in 1990, was not fully endorsed by his Cabinet
colleagues in the ruling Congress Party. Thus, the pace of his particular reforms visibly
decelerated in the second part of the Congress regime as general elections approached
in 1996.
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In other parts of East Asia reform agendas were home grown, sustained by strong
leadership and political support. However, few countries in the region sought a
domestie mandate for their policies and banked on the manifest benefits accruing from
their policies to compensate for the lack of such a mandate. As and when the economy
degenerated, the imposition of IMF-designed stabilization programmes in the wake of
the crisis of 1997, triggered a political upheaval in Indonesia which led to the fall of
President Suharato who had for 33 years presided over the Indonesian miracle. The
ensuing instability in Indonesia, associated with their financial crisis, the modalities of
its resolution, the vacuum created by the fall of a long-lasting ruler is far from over.
Any attempt to draw up a balanee sheet on the Suharto era wil thus have to sort out
the interface between its politics and policies.
Using aid to promote good governanee
The Bank's recommendation to direct aid to countries with astrong track record of
concrete performanee behind domestically initiated reform would thus again favour
China and Vietnam over Bangladesh or NepaL. The Bank's recipe for dealing with
countries with poor policies and no credible reform movement suggests a patient role
of disseminating ideas, transmitting experiences of other countries, training future
policymakers and leaders (italics mine). This again is a paradoxical position. Poor
policies and a credible reform movements defined by the Bank's yardstick could
exclude PRC and Viet Nam but include Sri Lanka whose failure may lie in weak
implementation. The Bank's prescription is obviously designed for countries with a
poor policy record and poor performance. This could cover Myanmar. But in South
Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal have good track records for policy reform but a poorer
record for improving governance.
To again assume that leaders should be educated by the experience of others would
suggest that we are clear about what needs to be disseminated or what constitutes best
practise or that the lessons are indeed transmittable across borders. People with the
relevant expertise also need to be identified. There is no record of the World Bank
inviting Chinese experts to advise Russia as to how to carry out reforms or inviting
Vietnamese to Nepal or Bangladesh to indicate why they were more successful in
attraeting FDI or reducing poverty.
The Bank's acceptance of the NGO agenda of promoting greater participation of
stakeholders in project design and supervision is well taken and there are already some
case studies of best practise. However the essenee of participatory development is that
this must derive from the domestie compulsions and political enga gement of the
government and be viable within the prevailing social configurations of the project
area. To have a World Bank funded irrigation project, where mue h effort has been
mobilised to induct local beneficiaries into the design of the project, must be part of a
broader institutional arrangement founded on the devolution of power, and local
political mobilisation of the stakeholders. If there is no local commitment for either
proeess or move to empower the poor in the face of resistance from local elites, a
donor designed exercise around a particular project could degenerate into a form of
tokenism where the prevailing local leadership builds a Potemkin facade to satisfythe
donor's notions of participation. Such exercises may thus last as long as the aid
officials and consultants DSA budget permits them to stay in the £ieId. The notion of
donor-created islands of participation is thus not likeIy to be sustainable and could
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degenerate into one more failed project without a more substantive involvement
through specific institutional arrangements by the recipient government to involve the
local people.
Endogenising policy reforms
Once the Bank and other donors embrace the proposition that reforms depend mainly
on domestic political and social factors, the donor have to come to terms with the
limited influence they can exercIse over domestie policyagendas in the DCs. In the
wake of this renovation in the Bank's approach to policy reforms conditional lending
would need to be phased out. The Bank again recognises that conditionality is unlikely
to bring lasting reform if there is no strong domestic movement for change (italics
mine). Thus, only when domestie constituencies are committed to reform, adjustment
loans and foreign aid can help consolidate policy gains (italics mine). In such a context
the donors can and indeed should do no more than suggest to the concerned
governments that they need to get their act together, design reforms and commit
themselves to the implementation of these reforms. Out of this reform proeess the need
for aid can be articulated in a variety of areas from Technical Assistance (TA), to
budget and balanee of payments support offered for a finite period whilst revenue and
export earnings capacities are built up.
Throughout Asia, with perhaps the exception of Cambodia and Lao PDR, there is no
country which lacks the domestie capacity to design its own reforms. This capacity
must be mature enough to recognise where skill and knowledge gaps exist so that
donor resources can be solicIted to fund the necessary TA. Again PRC, India and
Vietnam have exercised ownership over their reforms and have articulated their own
need for T A which has, as aresult, been much more effectively used than was the case
of TA imposed from without upon Bangladesh or NepaL. If donors are to recognise the
need for policy ownership and the role of cIvil society in promoting this ownership
there is not a great deal that they can do except to react to such local initiatives.
Donors have, for too long, attempted to lea d reforms. This of ten follows in the wake
of slow progress by a country in designing its own policy reforms. The W orId Bank or
UNDP tends to lose patience with such tardiness and prefer to call in expatriate
consultants but with a facade of local participation added on. Donors thus also need
patience and self-discipline. They should not make the mistake of promoting
ownership which would itself be a contradietion in terms.
The circumstances governing the assumption of local ownership wil vary from region
to region. Within Asia, paradoxically, South Asia is a region with the strongest
potential for assuming ownership over its policy agendas. It has established astrong
democratie tradition in every country. In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri
Lanka free elections have ended in periodic regime changes. Whilst the working of
parIiamentary institutions leaves much to be desired the prospect of electoral defeat,
has established a measure of accountability on every regime. The press is relatively free
and lends itself to extracting transparency from the government of the day. However
long exposure to autocracy and a tradition of bureaucratie concealment leaves much
scope for making public affairs more transparent. Both accountability and
transparency need, however, to be extended to the private sector which tends to
conceal a variety of misdeeds which are not exposed to the public or penalised in the
20
C M I
mark et place because of their collusive association with the state and the imperfections
of the market.
The role of civil society
South Asia als o has a highly pro-active civil society manifest not just in the profusion
and quality of its NGOs, some of which are world famous, but in the growth of civic
activism. Finally its professional resources are comparable to any in the Third World
so that its capacity to design its own reform agendas waits on the will of governments
to reduce their dependenee on donor advise and on the part of donors to practise what
they preach over policy ownership. South Asia, outside India, has for two decades
been inundated with expensive expatriate T A, usually of poor quality and with
negligible use value due to lack of ownership.
In the case of East/S.E. Asia, whilst professional skils, and political commitment to
design and implement reforms is also in evidence, the introduction of mechanisms of
accountability and transparency into their systems of governanee remain more
difficult. Outside of Thailand and the Philippines, the democratie tradition, backed by
a system of political pluralism and an independent press, has been weak and civil
society has, thus, remained underdeveloped. In PRe and Vietnam there is virtually no
such thing as a civil society and every initiative originates with the state, including the
patronisation of NGOs and think tanks. In Indonesia, ROK and Malaysia civil society
has begun to demonstrate Its strength and the capacity to lay the foundations of a
more accountable system of governance. But in ROK and Indonesia the influence of
the military still needs to be constrained and subordinated to democratie institutions.
ROK has moved a long way in this direction by not only holding two former military
heads or states accountable for their misdeeds but has even managed to sentenee them
to imprisonment. In contrast, in Indonesia the military, even with the fall of Suharto, is
still very much in command and much stronger civil mobilisations may be needed
before they subordinate themselves to democratie authority. In Malaysia and
Singapore the concept of multi-party political systems, lea ding to political pluralism
and the threat to a ruling party of having to vacate office at the polIs, is stil not in
place so that democratie institutions areyet to take root.
The capacity of the leadership in East/SE Asia to alleviate the poverty of their citizens
through appropriate policies and better economic management has earned them some
protection from democratie demands for a more pluralist system. However, in both
ROK as well as Thailand its citizens have demonstrated that economic prosperity is
not an acceptable substitute for the realisation of their rights. Indeed, where the
economic boom moves in to recession, with its impact on the prosperity of the poor,
autocratic regimes expose themselves to political challenge. The compulsion to
maintain economic prosperity and alleviate poverty thus remains high since Indonesia
has already demonstrated the high political cost of economic failure. But just as
economic crises can be contagious, democratie assertion can also be communicated
across borders. Thus, even those regimes in East Asia who continue to sustain the
prosperity of their citizens by alleviating their poverty will need to make their political
proeess more accountable and participatory.
The role of aid in mo ving the Asian region towards better governanee is likely to be
minimal since in most of Asia they lack the leverage to do this. This has not prevented
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donors from seeking to influence not just economic policy but the promotion of
transparency and even free elections in a variety of countries. In such a proeess, faced
by recalcitrant governments, donors have sought to go over the head governments to
deal with civil society. Unfortunately civil society itself is an elusive concept. Donors,
in search of civil society whether in Asia or SSA have of ten been tempted to use their
aid to fabricate a civil society by using NGOs as a surrogate for civil society. This
donor approach to building civil society through NGOs creates new channels of
dependenee manifest in the plethora of NGOs throughout Asia whose institutional
existence and the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of their employees now depends
on foreign aid. In Asia, when the dependenee of the state on aid to underwrite its
activities has been in visible decline over the last decade, the external dependenee of
the NGOs has expanded exponentially. This escalation in aid dependenee of most of
the NGOs raises serious problems for their sustainability since, unlike the state, very
few NGOs have shown any capacity for weaning themselves from aid. Furthermore
most such NGOs suffer from their own problems of accountability and transparency.
The availability of aid to underwrite the salaries of large numbers of grassroot NGO
workers is paradoxically reducing the scope and impact of political parties active at
the grassroots level who remain committed to the cause of the dispossessed. Similady,
many civic organisations committed to uphold the rights of the poor as an act of
vocation are finding it difficult to sustain themselves. Many of these forces are losing
their cadres to the NGOs and the very act of civic engagement is now being
undermined by aid which promises salaries, offces and even Pajeros to those who
once embraced a life of sacrifice and austerity to demonstrate their solidarity with the
poor. In these circumstances, the agenda of Robin Cook Britain's incumbent Foreign
Secretary and other progressive minded donors anxious to introduce democracy,
human rights and the building of civil society into aid agendas, is fraught with hazard.
Such donor-backed civic activism not only undermines spontaneous acts of civic
mobilisation but reduces their credibility as these are seen to be inspired from outside.
Donor leverage on regimes to promote democratie governanee
In Asia, in only a few countries do aid donors now command enough leverage to
influence the political orientation of a government. Even in Indonesia, Suharto was not
brought down by donors anxious to perpetuate democracy but by the people of
Indonesia reacting to an externally imposed reform proeess. A weak economy such as
Myanmar has for two decades managed to resist donor pressure to democratise its
polit Y because of its low exposure to aid and even foreign capitaL. The one country
where donor pressure did nudge a country to democracy was the Philippines, which
had been made heavily dependent on aid in the last decade of the Marcos era and was
an area where the United States traditionally exercised considerable leverage over the
local military establishment. It should at the same time be kept in mind that US as well
as Wodd Bank aid sustained the Marcos dictatorship in power for over a decade
through large infusions of aid in the expectation that Marcos would transform the
Philippines into the next Korea.
It is, however, largely in South Asia that donors continue to exercise any degree of
political leverage. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal are sufficiently
dependent on aid, even today, to expose themselves to considerable pressure from
donors in the area of human rights and democratie governance. Whilst this
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dependenee on aid, in quantitative terms, has visibly declined in all these countries
during the 1990s, the dependenee on policyadvise from donors remains strong. The
psychology of dependenee on donors has become ingrained in the psyche of political
and bureaucratie decision-makers and even the military who remain firmly convinced,
even today, that their donors hold their political lifeline in their hands.
In the prevailing circumstances of South Asia, during the hightide of their dependenee
aid, military regimes have ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1971 and from 1977 to 1989,
Bangladesh from, 1975 to 1979 and from 1982-89, and an autocratic monarch ruled
Nepal for most of its recent history. The responsibility of the donors is not
insignificant in perpetuating such autocratic rule over this long period in Asia and
indeed in mue h of Africa and Latin America. So great was the dependenee of many of
these countries on aid during this earlier period that a collective decision by the
principal donors to withhold aid to any of these countries, until free and fair elections,
under international supervision, were hel d and a plural political system established,
would have elicited instant compliance. Instead aid donors underwrote these
autocracies, lavished them with economic aid and in the case of Pakistan, with military
aid and thereby contributed to the destruction of democracy in these countries. In each
of these countries the autocratic rulers curried favour with the donors by both serving
their strategic agendas and uncritically accepting their policyadvise, usually
communicated through the World Bank who became the ideological mentor of these
odious regimes. In this environment of tolerance for autocratic rulers, donors also
tolerated conspicuous violations of human rights as well as pervasive corruption and
misgovernance in the then mistaken belief that following the economic advise of the
donors would yield the prosperity which would serve as a solvent for undemocratic
rule. Appeals by civIc organisations to the donors to exercise their influence on the
donors to improve their human rights record of ten went unheeded.
In this contemporary era of commitment to democracy it is hoped that the donors wil
at lea st use their remaining influence in these countries to ensure that there wil be no
regression into autocratic rule. This could be ensured by taking a collective categorical
decision that in all regimes, if not everywhere then at least in South Asia, it a freely
elected regime is overthrown by a military coup, all aid wil be instantly suspended.
Such a threat would be highly credible in South Asia and indeed man y other countries
throughout the world where donors still exercise a high degree of economic leverage.
However neither India, nor regimes in the East Asia region outside of the Philippines,
are likely to be impressed by such a threat since donor influence in most of these
countries has for sometime been limited.
The problem with moves to politicise aid flows and lise it in the service of ideology,
lies in the inconsistency with which such principles are applied. Such gestures only
work if a donor has leverage. Efforts by the Netherlands to persuade Suharto to
improve Indonesia's treatment of East Timor led to a decision by Indonesia to suspend
economic links with the Netherlands. It was the Dutch who had to make peace with
Indonesia on the promise that they would not delve into such political concerns.
Efforts by the US to exert pressure on India against holding nuclear tests and to sign
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and nuclear test ban treaty (NTBT) had
liule effect because of India's low exposure to aid. Similarly, the unwillingness of other
donors to risk their business links with India and Pakistan by pressuring them on the
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nuclear issue has reduced the impact of US sanctions in India. Indeed, even the US,
anxious not to lose a large market for farm products in Pakistan provided a
Congressional waiver for food sales to Pakistan in spite of its reluctance to sign the
NTBT. In the same way US agitation over the events in Tiananmen Square in PRC and
the issue of human rights cam e to liule because of the reluctance of succes sive US
regimes to sacrifice the large US business stake in PRC by puuing pressure on China to
change its political practises. If aid as an instrument for promoting democracy, is
applied entirely on pragmatic considerations so that it does not disturb commercial or
strategic relations it loses much of its value. No principle thus appears to underwrite
such an aid policy beyond the scope for economic leverage and the absenee of a
strategic and economic stake in a particular country.
In the prevailing circumstances, at least within Asia, a system of donor driven political
reforms is not likely to prevail in those countries who cannot be pressured. Those who
can be pressured, such as Pakistan, thus feel unfairly trea te d and permit for the
accumulation of massive popular resentment at the injustices inherent in donor policy.
Such inconsistency and even hypocrisy inherent in donor practise if not
pronouncements on using aid in the service of democracy, can of ten assurne regime
threatening proportions. Genuflecting to donor political pressures could expose a
regime to democratie upheaval and even overthrow.
Conclusion: Towards policy ownership
Available capacities for self-reliance in Asia
What is the eventual scope for reforming aid policy in Asia. Hopefully, the experience
of the past wil encourage donors to recognise that in most countries of Asia they
should be left to design their own policyagendas and articulate a need for aid. Most
Asian countries can call on the services of local professional resources, have the
institutional base, political capacity and an active civil society to assume ownership
over their own destiny. Donors should thus resist the temptation of tantalising hesitant
Asian regimes with offers of aid to embrace donor agendas whether for structural
adjustment reforms or even for alleviating poverty and promoting human
development. These are societies which are mature enough to decide what they want
and what price they wil pay for this. Donors remain at li bert y to direct their aid to
regimes which will target poverty and human development or even liberalise their
trade regime. It should, however, not drive these countries towards such agendas
whereby they have liule commitment or capacity to implement them and embrace such
policies largely in order to access fungible aid resources.
Autonomy in policy design
At least in Asia every demand for aid or TA could thus originate within the concerned
country. They could prioritise their development agendas, design policies and
programmes to realise the se agendas by assuming responsibility for project
preparation. They should in the proeess be able to articulate their need for technical
and programme assistance. Such programmes should be underwriuen by macro and
sectoral policies which should articulate the need for aid at the macro and project level
and define its form as to project or programme financing. The recipients should
manage all such aided projects and assume full responsibility for coordinating aid. The
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era of the World Bank or UNDP led donor consortium or aidgroup should be
formally terminated. All such mechanisms of aid coordination through meetings
between government and donors should be located within and cha ire d by the host
country. Ideally the recipient government should indude the political opposition and
civil society organisations in its consultative proeess for designing policies and as
participants in the aid group meeting but this proposition would depend up on the
maturity of the democratie culture in a country.
Under such a transformed dispensation donors should resist the temptation to prepare
grey cover reports on policy reform, design projects or bring in consultants to design
the TOR of a TA project. Donors should retain their right to evaluate government
proposals rather than substitute their own policy intervention. Where such proposals
appear credible they should support the initiatives. Where there are policy
disagreements, ideally donors should give the government the chanee to implement it
own policy provided that it is soundly designe d and enjoys domestie political support
even if it varies from a donor's notion of policy correctness (PC). If the policy fails,
donors may either seek a policy change doser to what donors deem to be PC or they
may withdraw aid and let the country finanee its own 'follies'. However even where a
particular donor decides that a policy is inappropriate and thus, chooses to withhold
aid, there should be some scope for a free mark et amongst donors, where the
government can seIl its policy to another donor. In an open market for ideas the
principal donors should not assume hegemonic postures in setting the policy agenda
where all donors are expected to coordinate their strategy towards a particular country
under the umbrella of the World Bank or UND P.
Partnerships
Establishing autonomy over policy design demands strong, sustainable institutions.
However weak institutions remain a severe constraint on promoting sustainable
development in most DCs, even in Asia. The idea of building capacity within the DC's
through twinning between DC and AIC institutions has thus gained currency to help in
the start-up of DC institutions. A number of such partnerships have serve d to build
DC institutions because of the hands-on linkage with a successful AIC institution. Such
a relationship is seen as both improving governanee within the DC institution and
eventually establishing effective ownership over such a facility.
Within the perspective articulated above on Asia's aid experience, the concept of
institutional partnership depends on the capacity for equal participation by both sides,
in such an institutional relationship. The real problem faced by a large numbers of
developing countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa but also in South Asia and parts of
Latin America, is the degeneration in available institutional capacities. The very
institutions built up so painfully, of ten with donor assistance, deteriorate with the
passage of time. A proeess of professional attrition sets in most such DC institutions
due to loss of able people not just to the multilateral institutions but also to the private
sector and to the consultancy market at home built up through donor funds.
Attempts to build new institutional partnerships sustained by a well established
institution in the developed world has promise if it involves a genuine partnership. The
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), the aneestor of the Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) was built though such a partnership between
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Stanford and Harvard University and PIDE. BIDS itself has a history of a satisfactory
partnership with the CMI in Bergen. Such partnerships were very successful at the
outset and proved sustainable as long as BIDS remained a viable, dynamic, well-led
institution. However, as the institution decayed so did the scope for partnership also
weaken.
There are a number of other joint-ventures put in place at the time a DC institution
was being built. The idea was to draw upon the accumulated expertise of the AIC
institution to transfer skils and management practises to its local counterparts.
Unfortunately few such institutions remained sustainable unless underwritten by an
infusion of aid resources. Even the injection of resources to underwrite the partnership
may do little to sustain the DC institution once the resources run out. A successful
partnership demands that a DC institutions can continue to provide institutional
support in the way of personnei for TA, upgrading of skilIs and even institutional
backup at critical stages of the service cycle. However all this depends on the building
and sustainability of domestie professional and institutional capacity and the
willingness of policymakers to draw upon such capacities. The best such institutions
found in India or ROK and indeed in rare cases in many DCs, have to demonstrate
their sustainability once their partnership is terminated by proving their use va lue to
society. Failed partnerships thus originate in the inability to endogenise policymaking
through using domestie institutions to service the felt needs of both policymakers and
civil society. Aid resources, to the extent that they underwrite inflows of TA whether
delivered by individual professionals or institutions, do a disservice to the
sustainability of DC institutions as well as to the building of credible partnerships, by
making DC governments reluctant to make fuller use of domestie capacities.
My paper addresses the overall environment within which Asian and indeed most DC
partnerships faiL. This does not rule out individual successes built around the
commitments of the DC institution to leave behind transferred technology and
managerial skils located in sustainable domestie institution. It merits fuller empirical
investigation to explore the hypothesis that DC's such as in East Asia or India, which
have put emphasis on self-reliance in institutional building and policy design, also
create a more stable basis for building sustainable partnerships with developed country
institutions. This proposition holds good for partnerships both in the public and
private sector . Donors wiling to invest in such partnerships should thus focus on
promoting local ownership over policy as a precondition for building sustainable
institutions, whether through institutional partnerships or by drawing in individual T A
as part of the felt needs of a particular institution. The operative issue must be to leave
it to the domestie institution to articulate this need out of their own self-awareness of
their professional limitations and wilingness to use expatriate institutions to build up
their professional base.
The primacy of ownership
The argument in this paper emphasising the recapture of policy ownership in the DCs
is premised on the belief, based on three decades of experience, that unless countries
assume responsibility for their own destiny and commit themselves to transform the
lives of their most deprived citizens, no policy reform or economic transformation is
feasible and no donor can impose this on a country however weak they may be. This
hypothesis remains a via ble basis for aid policy in most Asian countries because they
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have the capacity to take charge of their own affairs. Even though this principal has
universal applicability one cannot speak with a similar degree of conviction about
other regions whose capacity to assumecharge of their own future needs to be
ascertained after careful analysis. However, even where countries cannot assume such
responsibilities the emphasis should be placed on domestie capacity building, drawing
upon the skils and experiences of their neighbours and other Third World countries.
In this respect effective institutional partnerships with DC institutions should
increasingly be sought with successful DC institutions whose experience with
institution building is likely to be more relevant to that of another DC institution.
27
CM I
Institutional development, institutional
cooperation, partnerships, twinning and joint
ventures - So many concepts: What are the
issues?
KIM FORSS, ANDANTE - TOOLS FOR THINKING AS
i would like to express my gratitude for having the opportunity to address you on this
important and difficult subject; a subject which I have spent much time trying to learn
about and to understand. With no further comments, much remains to be done both
practically and theoretically, and the present seminar is a very welcome opportunity to
exchange ideas and hopefully to generate new insights.
When Douglas North and Robert Thomas, among others used the term institutional
development a decade ago and more, they did so as economists returning to political
science, sociology and history to help explain what eau ses development. They turne d
to institutions as one of those holistic terms like technology that explain what remains
to be explained after labour, land and capital have played their part in the explanatory
proeess. But do institutions explain development?
What is institutional development? Let me point to a few examples. When social
values change, when networks are formed between cIvil society, research and business,
when the rule of law is extended, when peace prevails and conflicts are solved through
democratically elected bodies in calm argumentation, when markets flourish and
investments accumulate, we see evidence of institutional development. But does this
explain development? No, it is the thing itself. It does not explain development - it is
development. Institutional development is an end in itself, it is the goal we pursue. And
the question remains, how can proeesses of institutional development be set in motion,
which are the causes that explain institutional development.
Among the causal factors are, no doubt; institutional cooperation, )Ollt ventures,
twinning and partnerships. They are tools through which a number of organisations
are cooperating with each other. The purpose of their cooperation is institutional
development.
What are then the issues, or the stakes, in institutional development? That depends
very much on who you are and what you represent. Organisations and people in them
seek their own advantage; access to knowledge and information, new skils and
aptitudes, investment capita L - or investment opportunities, knowledge about markets,
opportunities to test new personnei or in other ways strengthen their position through
international networks. Stil, most of their objectives are different, their explicit
objectives as well as the hidden ones. This has constantly surprised me. No matter
which organisations I have looked into, I seldom find that more than a very small part,
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say 5 to 10 %, of the objectives for cooperation are shared. It is better to realise that
to have naive assumptions of commonalities of interest.
What the organisations do have in common is a wish to change. The nave around
which the whole field of institutional cooperation spins is organisational change.
Organisations cooperate because they wish to change, and that is their least common
denominator. Hence, the issue is to understand organisational change, because one
needs to understand in order to plan, take decisions, to act, and follow-up, and later
with insight, and possibly wisdom, contemplate the results. But who dares say that he
or she understands organisational change? Would anybody put up a hand? I would
certainly not, but I would like to point at three factors that make organisational
change such a hard phenomenon to grasp:
1. Change is non-linear. What does that mean? In a linear model, the extent of an
effect is expected to be similar to the extent of its cause. For example, if we invest
USD 1 milion USD in corporate training programmes, we would expect increases
in efficiency of a little bit more than USD 1 milion. But in a non-linear system a
ti ny event - or a cause - can produee huge, unexpected effects. In arecent
evaluation of technical training undertaken by Sida, we found that small amounts
of training, at costs around USD 10 000 yielded benefits of some USD 25 milion;
that is, there were multiplier effects of around 250.
In popular science, this is of ten referred to as the butterfly effect - a term borrowed
from the meteorological sciences. The effects of a butterfly flipp ing its wings causes
tiny changes in air pressure which escalate through feedback proeesses and generate
a storm on the other side of the earth. It is a popularised image, but it is reaL. There
can be no doubt that "butterfly effects" are real in proeesses of organisational
change.
2. Change occurs as qualitative leaps. In retrospect, important events in an
organisation's life happ en rapidly, and of ten many things happ en at the same time.
New owners, new capital, market opportunities, new technologies, or massive
growth in new membership. Suddenly all things fall in place, and the system can be
rapidly transformed. Our mental images of development seems to be formed
around notions of a few percents annual growth over long periods time - a steadily
upward sloping curve. Reality is more drastie than so.
10 years ago Sweden had a thriving record industry with several medium-sized
companies. Then radio traffic was deregulated, programme time increased 400%.
Vinyl records disappeared and the cd changed the economics of production and
distribution. The new market situation triggered foreign investments, and in two
years time most of the Swedish record industry had disappeared, gone bankrupt or
was bought by the multinationals.
3. Change occurs as a consequence of many factors rather than particular isolated
causal connections. The idea of duster effects means, simply speaking, that all
things have to be in place before the system changes. It is like the slot machine,
where you can only win if the three cherries show at the same time. Similarly with
policy initiatives in a global setting, very of ten many things have to happen at the
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same time if an effect is to be produced - and then the changes can be considerable
in a very short period of time. WHO is an organisation which has been through
two major reform programmes in the 1990s, with no visible effects. But under new
management, with new ideas emerging from inside the organisation, and against
the background of major reform in the UN system, the conditions appears to be
more favourable. But more is needed than new management or good ideas.
The notions of non-linearity, qualitative leaps and eluster effects may seem high ly
theoretical, but they are a necessary starting point. It is useful to remember Lord
Keynes's advice that there is nothing more practical than good theory. A deeper
understanding of organisational change is necessary in order to level expectations,
understand the challenges, and to find the workable practical solutions. A basic
understanding of what type of proeesses we are dealing with wil help us avoid the
most blatant mistakes. Before turning to the more practical issues of organisational
design, I would like to point at a dilemma that of ten has confronted me when dealing
with organisations; that is, some organisations appear more elever than others, but it is
not the most elever organisations who carry the game.
In very broad terms it is possible to distinguish two types of organisations; that of the
reflective, analytical organisation and that of the action-oriented organisation. Let us
first look at the characteristics of the action organisation.
An action organisation is largely legitimised by providing action, by delivering elear-
cut results (of ten in terms of profit, market share, or some other plain indicator of
performance). Managers define goals and business ideas; they create a corporate spirit,
a corporate culture. The variety of ideas and opinions which members presumably
have when they join the organisation is reduced and absorbed in to the common
ideology. In a complex world, which can be understood in many ways, the
organisation circumscribes its members' understanding. To put it bluntly, the action
organisation makes people narrower and stupider that they were before they joined it.
The action organisation is geared to solutions rather than problems. Only when we
have a solution can we act, and shared loyalty to an organisational ideology wil make
it easier to find solutions. (The car was the idea Ford had in mind, not the problem of
transportation; ball-bearing was the idea that launched SKF, not the problem of
frietion). Action is easier when a powerful organisational ideology obtains and conflict
is suppressed. Thus the action organisation cultivates great confidence. The members
of the organisation are convinced that their view of the world is the right one. The
action organisation cultivates a spirit of enthusiasm rather than criticism. It may seem
a bit stupid, but it gets things done.
The reflective/analytical organisation receives support because it propagates values and
ideals the constituents endorse. The reflective analytical organisation must reflect a
variety of ideas and demands and it must satisfy the expectations of diverse groups in
its environment. Thus, a central feature is that it reflects inconsistent norms. It reflects
inconsistent norms by talking about issues. The reflective organisation thrives on
problems. It identifies problems, discusses and analyses problems, defines strategi es
and policies endlessly. It is good at producing manuals, and it is good at evaluating.
The more difficult the problems are the better, and best of all is unsolvable problems.
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Consequently important structures and proeesses in the reflective organisation are
aimed directly at the environment. The idea is to demonstrate goals, visions, structures
and methods to the outside world and to show that the organisation is atten ding to the
demands made upon it. It speaks to business about economic development, but it
speaks to NGO's in another voIce and to public bodies on other subjects; subjects
dose to the heart and ideology of those audiences. Do we know any examples of such
organisa tions?
Remember that the caricature above is meant to show archetypes of organisation. In
real life organisations combine elements of both. The point is that some organisations
are more like action organisations and some more like reflective organisations, and the
recipes for success depends on how they are identified. When an action organisation
engages in cooperation with a reflective organisation, both need to be very aware of
each others motivations and expectations, otherwise the proeess could become very
destructive. In our fields, NGOs and private firms are much more like action
organisations, while aid ageneies tend to be more reflective. This lies in their roles and
neither should be surprising. But the actors need to be aware of the problems as well
as the opportunities inherent in these roles.
Let us proceed to the proeess of the cooperation. Most of what organisations want
from each other when they cooperate is knowledge and information, for example
about routines, procedures, structures, division of labour, coordination, delegation of
authority, how to create accountability etc. To get the knowledge, they have to learn -
whether we speak of the northern partner or the southern partner. Learning is thus
another of the key elements in understanding organisational change.
Organisational learning is an oxymoron, a contradietion in terms, like safe air travel
or military intelligence. Organisation implies order and structure, and putting things in
relation to each other, creating patterns and proeesses. Learning, on the other hand,
implies breaking structures and challenging order, exploring the new and unknown.
The two do not live easily together.
Much has been written on the subject of learning organisations, but so far little has
been applied to development cooperation, in particular in respect of how the learning
of partner organisations from the South can be strengthened. The practical solutions to
learning means treading a careful balance. The learning organisation balances between
destructive turbulenee and stifling order. Keeping it on the borderline is the supreme
managerial task. I would like to point at five particularly important design variables
that need to be taken into account in institutional cooperation to strengthen learning.
. Continuity and change among personneL.
. Exploitation of old knowledge and exploration of new.
. Top-down leadership and bottom-up initiatives.
. Technical specialisation and crosscutting issues.
. Stable boundaries versus flexible teamwork.
The difficulty is how the balanee should be struck in any particular case. In most
instances of institutional cooperation that I have come across there was an imbalance
towards the left hand side of each of the dichotomies mentionedabove; too much
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continuity, too mue h exploitation of old knowledge, too much top-down leadership,
too much technical specialisation and too mue h stable (rigid) boundaries. There seems
to be a need to tilt the balanee in favour of flexibility, change, bottom-up initiatives,
crosscutting competencies and more flexibility in organisation design.
Institutional cooperation, like other proeesses of organisational change, needs to strike
the balanee between order and chaos. Too much order creates bureaucracy and sti fles
learning and creativity, whereas chaotic conditions slow down efficiency and
effectiveness. In between, organisations develop complex structures to man age the
borderline. It is a practical managerial challenge to develop complexity that allows the
organisation to re ap the benefits of both order and chaos, and it is a challenge for
funding ageneies to encourage complex structures to emerge.
The real issue and the solution to many practical managerial dilemmas, lie in
developing complex structures that allow the cooperation to thrive in the thin
borderline between stifling order and an overwhelming mess. To produee more order,
to reduce variety and increase control is simple; It is equally simple to embrace chaos.
But the sustainability of institutions, as well as of institutional cooperation, lie in a
Cantonese increase in complexity.
I would thus like to end this speech on the optimistic note that we can look forward to
two full days of complexity.
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'Twinning' as a method of sustainable
institutional capacity building
PROFESSOR PETER SLUNT, NORTHERN TERRITORY UNIVERSITY,
AUSTRALlA1
Aim and nature of study
. Aim: To assess the efficacy of institutional Twinning arrangements as vehicles for
sustainable capacity building , and to explore ways of enhancing the method.
. Issues:
~ learning proeesses, at the individual and organisational levels
~ assumptions about skil and knowledge transfer
~ effects of asymmetrical patterns of power, influence, resources, expertise, and
experience between twinned organisations
~ incentives and disincentives inherent in the twinning proeess
~ contradietions between sustainable capacity development and improvement at
the technical level
~ expectations and perceptions of donor and the partner organisations
. Nature: empirical (cases from Laos and Namibia, and experience of researchers in
many other countries) and theoreticaL.
Key issues and definitions
Superordinate goals
. poverty eradication
. sustainable development
. Example: the notion of sustainable human development (SHD), which focuses on
people's capacIties to improve their own lives through better education and health,
higher incomes, and the sustainable use of the earth's resources.
Governanee
. Main actors:
~ State
~ Civil Society
~ Private Sector
These are speaking notes only. An article prepared by Peter Blunt and Merrick Jones will soon be
published in Public Administration and Development.
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. InstItutions
~ Legislatures
~ Parliaments
~ Judicial systems
~ Other regulatory systems
~ Electoral bodies
~ Financial
~ And so on
Institution building and organisation building
. Use of terms: Terms such as 'capacity building', 'institution building', 'institutional
and organisational development, and 'institutional capacity building' are of ten
used inter-changeably
. Definition: The term institution building in practice usually embraces programmes
of constructive change in single organisations or clusters of organisations, and is
designe d to improve their performance and capacity to develop new capabilities
independently; that is, their ability to learn from, and adapt to, their environments.
The term is also used to refer to the strengthening or re-design of the broa der
mechanisms, or institutions, which regulate societies and economies; for example,
macro-economic management systems, legal and judicial systems, and electoral
systems.
. Growing interest in institutions as well as organisations
. Two terms needed: institution building and organ isa ti on building
. Context
. Meaning
Sustainabilty
. Definition: In organisations and institutions, as with biological organisms,
sustainability implies survival, which depends on a willingness and capacity to
learn and adapt quickly and well to changing circumstances. The idea of
sustainability has been applied most widely in relation to the natural environment,
where it usually means that future generations should have available a natural
resource base which is at least equivalent to that enjoyed by people now. This
implies that organisations and institutions should learn and adapt in ways that take
particular account of the depletion of non-renewable resources.
The imperatives of context
. Pragmatism versus ideology
. Ideological approaches less concerned with context
. Pragmatism encourages swot-type analyses of context
'Meanings' and perspective
. "Whose definitions should count?"
. Meaning is not universal
~ Institution building
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~ Good governanee
~ Free trade
~ Human rights
~'Impeachability' (!)
~And so on
. Ideological hegemony of western ideas and meanings
. The reality is that different interpretations exist
The rhetoric of twinning
. Motivated partly by:
~ Problems with 'delivery' of technical assistance
~ Desire to influence organisation as well as individual
~ Poor results achieved by (then) conventional practice
~Trends in the literature - OD etc.
. Involves:
~ Partnerships between organisations with similar remits, one in a (usually) rich
country and the other in a poor country
~ "Mutual learning from the sharing of experiences" etc.
~ Creating "learning organisations" which demands:
D extraordinarily capable leadership
D vision and strategic awareness
D willingness of members to question
D a climate which encourages this
D skils of critical reflection
D regular and varied opportunities for questioning and reflection
D constant desire to learn from successes and failures
D capacity and wilingness to take action on basis of what has been
le arnt
D critical reflection on the outcomes of action
D development of a learning culture based on the above
D systems that reward the above
. Claimed strengths and benefits:
~ Ability to provide a broad range of relevant services
~Similarities of corporate identity and institutional mandates in the partners
~ Relevant competence and skils in the 'incoming' partner
~ Greater prospects for collegiality arising from organisational similarities
~ Easy, effective interaction
~ Internationally known (public)agencies have easier access to developing country
governments than, say, private consultancy firms
~ A forum for the exchange of professional skils and institutional praxis is created
~ Increased credibility and legitimacy in reia ti on to reform proeesses
~Support and autonomy for risk taking
~ Increased confidence, flexibility
~ Access to otherwise unavailable resources (mainly financial and technological) -
Note: this was the view of a DC partner
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~ Adaptability to unpredicted factors
~ Possibility of instilling a sense of pride and wil to achieve
~ Possibility of developing management capabilities
~ Possible psychological and political advantages, "in that the twinning contract
gives at least the appearance of a two-way exchange"
~ Opportunities for international co-operation and the sharing of knowledge, and
for "breaking down the barriers between problems and approaches in
developed and developing economies", at a time when distinetions between the
two are becoming increasingly blurred.
. Learning organisations clearly carry a heavy load of responsibility
Findings
. Little shared understanding of the meaning and signifcance of what is intended (see
key terms above)
. "Learning organisations" are rare anywhere, even where the ideological and
resource circumstances are ideal- much rarer in dcs
. Both partners appeared not to be thinking too much about issues of the above type,
or to understand them
. Great variation re: "mutuality" of any learning that took place
. Heavy reliance on traditional activities:
~ Formal, off-job training courses
~ In-house training courses
~ On-job training
~ Study visits
. Little evidence of attention to demands of learning organisation - see above
. Developing country partner may - understandably - be more interested in other
things, such as:
~ Access to otherwise unobtainable physical resources such as vehicles and
computers
~ Unusual opportunities for individuals to further their careers via expensive
education and training, and for foreign travel
~Status which comes from donor attention over a lengthy period
~ Enhancement of organisational confidence that comes from the backing of an
empathetic partner organisation, and the stimulus of working with a wider range
of fellow professionals
~ These elements were apparent to a greater or lesser extent in both of the case
studies.
. Rich country partner may have other interests too, such as:
~ Significant stable income genera ti on over long periods
~ Opportunities for expanding professional competence
~ Opportunities to provide some sta ff members with professional challenge,
overseas travel, and financial reward
~ Possibility to achieve an enhanced international profile
. Other risks and weaknesses
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~ Incompatible partners: for political, geographical, social, historieal, status,
cultural, technological, structural and managerial reasons, and so on
~ Nominal core business may be the only thing they have in common
~ May become "arrangements among friends"
~ 'Developed' twin may assume a position of superiority in the relationship and
expect a passive, dependent partner (the antithesis of sustainability)
~ It may be difficult for the aid agency to evaluate and terminate
~ Incoming partner may be operating on commercIal lines, seeking to make
financIal gains from the partnership
~ Dependency (the antithesis of sustainable development) or resentment may occur
~ Possibility, indeed the probability, that individuals who receive training, or
acquire scarce skils in other ways, in a project will leave the organisation when
the project is terminated and they no longer enjoy the benefits it has provided
~ Strength of belief in twinning may limit or discourage exploration of other ways
of constructing a viable organisational co-operation project and, more broadly,
of alternative approaches to development co-operation in governanee
~ Twinning project may operate in a contextual vacuum, producIng a pocket of
enhanced organisational capacIty operating in unchanged surroundings
Renovating the twinning approach
. Refining the notion of organisational co-operation
~To help convey the idea that both partners have something to learn and have
equal responsibility for making things happen
~ Give attention to the wider institutional domain
~ Give emphasis to equal 'partnership' rather than provider-client relationship
~ Organisation development to the fore
. Critical elements of organisational co-operation:
~ Its base in a partnership between two organisations
~ Its emphasis on sustainable organisational capacity building
~ Its relatively long-term nature
~ Clear guidanee to incoming partner on donor's views concerning:
D superordinate goals
D its understanding of organisation and institution building
D its view of sustainable organisational outeornes
D the nature of the desired relationship between the two organisations
D the optimal duration of the relationship
D the roles of the long-term team lea der and advisers
D the selection of staff for the project
D managing and maintaining the vita lit y of the relationship
D terminatingthe relationship.
. Considerations in identifying suitable organisational partners:
~ Macro and micro contexts of both partners, including system compatibility, pace
and direction of governanee reform, infrastrueture, language, and so on
~ Most pressing needs of the developing country partner - that is, to what extent
are they primarily technical or organisational or managerial
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). Track record of the incoming partner, particularly the extent to which this
reveals its level of understanding of the key issues and aims of development and
its commitment to their realisation.
. Staff selection and the role of the long-term adviser:
Careful job analysis plus following generic qualities:
). Possession of a clear understanding of, and commitment to, the major aims of
development
). Capacity to understand and analyse broa der organisational and managerial issues
as well as technical ones
). Good interpersonal and cross-cultural skilIs
). Patience, ta et, energy, and tenacity
). Some ability to assess issues of strategic significance to the partners and the
domain of the project
Role:
). A broad and demanding one involving more than technical advice and
'housekeeping'
). Most critically, perhaps, the adviser should be the strategic viewfinder and sensor
for the incoming partner:
D What directions should the co-operation be taking to en sure
sustainability and institution and/or organisation building?
D What are the emerging key developments in the developing country
partner and its domain?
D What are the implications of these for co-operation activities?
D What are the key technical as well as managerial and organisational
issues?
). He or she should also be capable of playing a similar strategic role for the
developing country partner, but only when that partner wants this, and only in a
way which does not build dependency or act against sustainability
). The range of possible strategic questions is great - encompassing such issues as
the mission, role and function of the developing country partner itself, its culture,
its structure, its human resource management strategies, marketing, inter-
organisational interactions, and corporate image
). The ability to deal well with such issues demands long-term advisers with the
capability of a good chief executive officer, as well as diplomatic skilIs and the
ability to do all of the se things in another culture - demanding indeed
). It is essential that the role should involve the se elements, as successful
organisational co-operation depends so heavily on them. The adviser is very of ten
the best person to take ownership of these critical issues for the incoming partner
and to sense how far to go in relation to them from the point of view of the
developing country partner.
). The strategic management of the co-operation, and the success of the co-
operation, will hinge largelyon the way in which the adviser and the leadership
of the developing country partner tackle these issues together
. Managing and maintaining the vital it y of the relationship
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~ Management of the developing country partner in particular has to be aware that
the establishment of an organisational co-operation project within its structure
will have wider consequences than the delivery of equipment and the training of
staff.
~ Pre-project dialogue between the stakeholders must concentrate on the major
challenges which the project wil present, not just discussion of the operational
considerations which the log frame methodology encourages
~ Discussion of learning and sustainable capacity wil thus become a natural
element of the co-operation, reducing the tendency for priority to be directed to
technical/professional upgrading and for crucIal issues of management and
organisation to receive attention late in the project as something of an
afterthought
~ Within a clear framework of organisational change, it wil be more natural to
view activities within the co-operation as learning opportunities
~ Change proeesses constantly present new challenges that can become significant
vehicles for learning and development. For example, in any co-operation project,
evaluations - internal and external - present major opportunities for essential
questioning and critical reflection proeesses. The question "what can we learn
from this?" would thus become a routine element in the evaluation proeess.
. Optimising the length and nature of the relationship
~ Informed strategic judgements as the project proceeds
~ Agree the planned phases of the co-operation within the intended total duration,
so that the co-operation is seen to have a coherent schedule of stages and a
'natural' end
~ The nature of the relationship should be viewed flexibly
Beyond twinning
Macro and micro environments within which co-operation takes place are (or should
be) crucial to all aspects of the form that the co-operation takes, and the manner of its
enactment
A thorough assessment of the environment requires one to move beyond the immediate
context of organisational co-operation - that is, beyond the conventional parameters
normally associated with Twinning. It is necessary to examine the broader governanee
context within which organisational co-operation is situated in order to make the best
use of scarce resources. It is in this sen se that the merits of looking beyond Twinning
are now examined.
Contextual variables
In the categories set out below, the intention should not be to engage in detailed
discussion of each of the items listed, but rather to make brief assessments which can
give an indication of the state of affairs in each case and areasonably accurate overall
picture. However, once a likely target domain for co-operation has been identified,
more detailed examination of that domain and its domain hierarchy wil be necessary.
. Country characteristics and circumstances
1. Natural resource base
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2. Population size, density, growth rates, urban/rural distribution, and ethnic
heterogeneity
3. Human Development Index scores or similar
4. The position of women in society
5. The position of minorities
6. GDP, GDP growth, and per capita GDP in parity purehasing terms
7. Sectoral development
8. State of the environment
9. Geographie size and port access
10.Infrastructure
11. Special hazards or circumstances (e.g., famine, genocide, 'unexploded
ordinance', etc.)
12. Risks or threats
. Governanee
1. Broad nature of the economy (transitional etc.)
2. Legal institutions: laws, judiciary, courts, enforcement etc.
3. Form of political legitimacy
4. Political system
5. Leadership
6. The position of women
7. Public sector
8. State owned enterprises
9. Civil society
10. Private sector
11. Relations between the state, civil society and the private sector
12. Extent and nature of popular participation
13. Corruption
14.Major domains of policy co-operation and sources and forms of such co-
operation
15. Risks or threats
. Institutions
1. Strength, independence, impartiality and transparency of major institutions
of governanee (e.g., electoral and legal systems, the judiciary, law
enforcement, and so on)
2. The position of women
3. Impartiality
4. Levels of remuneration
5. Major domains of institutional co-operation and sources and forms of such
co-operation
6. Risks or threats
. Government organisations
1. Responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency
2. The position of women
3. Impartiality
4. Inter-organisational co-operation
5. Leadership
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6. Levels of remuneration
7. Major domains of organisational co-operation and sources and forms of
such co-operation
8. Risks or threats
. Human resources
1. Education and skils and gaps
2. Gender issues
3. Discipline and commitment
4. Labour force flexibility
5. Major domains of co-operation and sources and forms of such co-operation
6. Risks or threats
The argument to this point envisages development co-operation in governanee that is
under-pinned by a more inclusive profile of country characteristics and circumstances.
In this view, 'one-shot designs are not ruled out so long as they are well targeted or
situated. They should be regarded as one of a number of possible means or vehicles of
co-operation that can be used in any development co-operation setting.
Targeting for any development co-operation technique wil be most accurate and
effective when it is conducted on the basis of:
. a well articulated country profie, based on criteria such as those set out
immediately above; and
. a thorough appreciation of the domains of development co-operation within
governanee at which particular lines of development co-operation will be directed.
Domains of development co-operation
A domain of development co-operation consists of: (1) one or more institutional
elements; (2) a number of organisations; and (3) a wide range of activities, all of which
formally have a common purpose or common purposes. However, the different
perspectives brought to be ar by interested parties wil mean that perceived purposes
for a particular domain wil be likely to vary.
Accordingly, in the example set out below ('information'), the interests of different
stake holders are likely to vary significantly, and the state and development ageneies
must be interested in, and capable of, making judgements about the validity of such
interests.
Example
Damain:
Common purposes:
information
government decision-making
private sector decision-making
civil society participation
transparency
accountability
education
economic performance
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Institutional elements: political system
all policy
Organisations: central statistical office
ministries
other state entities
decentralised units
the media
users (civil society, private sector, etc.)
providers
Activities: collection and analysis
presentation and dissemination
interpretation and use
marketing
Domain seleetion, development and evaluation
. Domain selection - this wil depend on an assessment of country profie
characteristics. Selected domains, and their priority, will clearly be those that are
considered to possess special strategic significance for the realisa tion of
superordinate development objectives, such as poverty alleviation. Selected
domains can therefore be expected to vary from one country to another.
. Selection rationale - the country profile assessment should result in a coherent
rationale or argument concerning the selection of particular domains. Several
benefits wil flow from this. First, it wil assist with targeting and technique
selection within the domain. Second, it wil strengthen the position of the
development agency in relation to its own accountability and transparency. Third,
it should make co-operation more comprehensible, and therefore more
manageable, for development and implementing agency staff and other interested
parties, not least in the poor country itself. Statistics, audit and tax are clearly of
importanee in nearly all governanee settings, but equally clearly their relative
importanee wil vary from one set of circumstances to another; and the nature of
the organisations concerned wil vary, as will their domain hierarchy.
. Domain development - this will entail co-operation aimed at strengthening one or a
combination of institutional elements, organisations, and activities within a
particular domain. The mix of co-operation targets within a domain, and the
development co-operation techniques or vehicles employed, will depend on a
careful assessment of the needs and structure of the domain within the broader
context of the country profile, the activities of other ageneies, emergency
considerations, and so on. In the Laos case study, for example, organisational co-
operation might have attempted to improve user understanding of information,
and the downstream dissemination of information, as well as supply. This in turn
will have ramifications for the development activities within the organisational co-
operation.
. Evaluation - this should be conducted at two leveis: first, at the level of
development co-operation activities at the target sites within the domain; and
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second, at the level of the overall functioning of the domain itself where possible
knock-on effects from the target site can be assessed.
Decision-making critical path
Something like:
. Does the country satisfy the means test criteria for co-operation?
. Does the country profile give enough relevant information for a judgement to be
made about priority needs and strategic development co-operation domains within
governance, or strategic entry points? If not, where can such information be
obtained? If the information is not available or readily obtainable, are the country
needs so urgent or extreme that co-operation should proceed as best it can with the
information to hand?
. What are the major needs?
. What are the strategic development co-operation domains within governance?
What is the logic connecting them to the major needs?
. Are the selected domains subject to different risks or threats? Are any of the se risks
or threats so great as to make progress within the domain too difficult to justify the
investment of scarce resources?
. Which of the strategic domains or entry points matches the agency's strengths and
capabilities best?
. What are the structures of particular domains and the most critical needs within
them?
. Which development co-operation techniques or vehicles are best suited to the
particular needs and circumstances of the domain?
. Does the agency have experience of using that technique in this particular domain?
Is such experience deemed necessary in all cases?
. Are the expectations (of all parties) of development co-operation within selected
domains reasonable given the overall country profile and the particular
circumstances within the domain and at the target sites?
Conclusion
Like other forms of development co-operation, in the right context and with well-
chosen and briefed partners, Twinning can be the optimal method to employ.
However, in this paper, we have argued on the basis of theory, logic, case study data,
and personal experience that the method has tended to be employed uncritically. By
this we mean that insufficient attention has been given to ensuring that such co-
operation is predicated explicitly on clearly defined notions of sustainability and
institution building. We also mean that the super-ordinate goals of development are
not as clearly 'on the minds' of the people involved in Twinning - or, in our
experience, other - projects as they should be.
Also, the importanee and natur e of mutual learning between the organisations needs to
be established at the beginning of projects, and meanings need to be discussed and
clarified then, rather than assumed.
We also argue that many operational aspects of Twinning, such as staff selection and
the management of the relationship, are not getting as much attention as they deserve.
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Our thoughts about improving Twinning address the issues referred to immediately
above.
Moving beyond the conventional notion of Twinning, we introduce the ideas of
'domains' of governanee and 'domain hierarchies', arguing that judgements about the
efficacy of agency interventions need to be situated within such a context.
Agencies are the n in a better position to produee persuasive arguments about project
or programme targets or sites and about method.
We recognise that our suggestions require more 'up-front' expenditure on co-operation
projects than is typical at present - in the development of country profiles and the
assessment of domains of governanee and domain hierarchies.
But we clearly believe that this is desirable because it improves the prospects for
attaining the super-ordinate goals of development.
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The municipal partnership program between City
of Portage la Prairie (Canada) and Municipality of
Tubigon (Philippines)
S. DEAN Y AREMCHUK AND EUFRASlü MASCARINHAS
Overview of the FeM Program
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities has been recognized since 1937 as
Canada's national voice of municipal governments. FCM represents the interests of all
municipalities on policy and program matters within federal jurisdietion. Municipal
governments constituting FCM's membership represent more than 20 million
Canadians. FCM's members include Canada's largest cities, small urban and rural
communities and the 17 major provincial and territorial associations.
The creation of FCM's international program in 1987, in collaboration with the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), enabled Canadian municipalities
to exchange information and practical experience with counterparts in the South.
Municipal Partnerships are an important component of the International Office.
This municipal-to-municipal, local-government-to-local-government kind of inter-
national municipal cooperation had its roots in sub-Saharan Africa, and later
expanded to other continents. It is now active in countries of Africa, Latin American
and Southeast Asia.
Working with its partner CIDA, FCM, as the executing agency, defined a framework
for municipal participation to ensure efficiency and uniformity in the overall approach.
A niche was defined for Canadian municipal participation building on the CIDA
priority of human resources strengthening in the areas of municipal management and
governance.
A program management team at FCM provides assistance and monitoring to help
Canadian municipalities and their overseas partners in their new international
cooperation activities. FCM selects municipalities, approves proposals and helps the
two partners throughout their relationship.
To assist, a comprehensive set of guidelines - Municipal Partnerships Partners Guide -
has been developed to provide information about each steps of the implementation of
partnership activities.
In the Guide, the program is defined in the following way:
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"Municipal Partnerships program is a human resources development
program that links Canadian municipalities with local governments in
developing countries. The program provides opportunities for municipal
administrators, technicians, professionals, and political leaders to
increase their capacity to deal with common municipal development
issues by sharing experience, working together, and applying their
knowledge in practical situations."
Some of the key notions that define the program are:
. The notion of partnership: equal partners from different cultures and backgrounds
work together and share experiences; the partners identify, implement and assess
their activities together;
. The focus on human resourcesand capacity hu ilding as opposed to infrastrueture
development or equipment provision;
. The issue of sustainahility in terms of durability of the relationship and,
furthermore, sustainability of the solutions to situations and problems encountered;
. The very practical approach of the program: it is people with similar experiences,
facing similar problems working together, applying their knowledge in situations
they face daily in their professional lives.
A partnership is implemented through a series of short-term stays in the partner
municipality by municipal officials, council members and community representatives.
A partnership lasts on average two to five years.
The work co vers a wide range of diverse activities, such as:
. Solid waste management
. Computerization
. Water/wastewater
. Land tenure organization and tax collection
. Local economic development
. Public consultation proeess
The cooperation is managed by the partners themselves. In each partlCipating
municipality, a local coordinator is designated to manage all partnership activities.
Funding is provided to cover direct costs. of participation, including local and
international transportation, accommodation, meals and interpretation, where
necessary.
The municipal partners make an in-kind contribution by making it possible for their
employees to take part in activities.
A significant voluntary contribution is made by communities, through fund-raising
and equipment donations, the involvement of social clubs, neighbourhood
associations, schools, hospitals, chambers of commerce and other organizations.
What helps a municipal partnership work?
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. Enthusiasm and good wil- there is a lot of that across Canada for this type of co-
operation and the municipal participants who are making it a success.
. Support and participation - from Council, the municipal administration and the
community.
. A clear understanding by both partners of common objectives, responsibilities and
goals.
. Mutual benefit - both partners must feel that they are getting something out of the
relationship.
What do Canadian municipalities get out of participation in Municipal Partnerships?
. The satisfaction of exchanging ideas with other urban professionals;
. The value of things that are learned for use in Canadian cities;
. The value of things that are learned that can be shared with other cities around the
world;
. Economic activity and opportunity for Canadian municipal partners in providing
motivation and a renewed dynamism in one's work;
. The value to Canadian municipal officials and employees.
What is the goal of Municipal Partnerships?
. To improve the quality of life;
. To improve access to basic human necessities;
. To improve local capacity to define and carry out sustainable programs that meet
development needs.
How is it achieved?
. By community-to-community cooperation in activities that strengthen municipal
management and governanee practices that yield concrete, practical, measurable
results.
Overview of the Portage la PrairiejTubigon Protocol
Agreement
As indicated the FCM Partnership Program is a human resources development
program that links Canadian municipalities with local governments in developing
countries.
The goal of the partnership is to improve quality of life, access to basic human
necessities, and local capacity to define and carry out sustainable programs that meet
development needs.
Community-to-community cooperation in activities that strengthen municipal
management and governanee practices is the means to achieve this goal.
Successful municipal linkages are built on four key principles:
. Partnership
. Gender equity
. Capacity building and
. Sustainability.
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In terms of participation and seleetion, the City of Portage la Prairie applied to FCM
requesting involvement in the Partnerships Program and FCM developed the linkage
with Tubigon via LOGODEF - the Local Government Development Foundation in the
Philippines.
After a screening proeess by FCM whereby FCM staff visited Tubigon in August of
1995 both municipalities where notified that we would partner together commencing
in early 1996.
The cooperation program began with the Initial Missions, which allow both partners
to learn about the context for the partnership and to identify and agree on areas for
cooperation.
This initial missions consisted of the Mayor of Portage la Prairie and Mr. Dean
y aremchukvisiting Tubigon and discussing potential areas of cooperation and former
Mayor Mascarinas and Noel Mendana, the appointed overseas co-ordinator to the
project visiting Portage la Prairie to do the same.
After the se initial missions, a Protocol Agreement outlining the areas of cooperation
was developed, passed by resolution by both respective municipal councils, signed,
sealed and delivered on May 30, 1996.
This document was then forwarded to FCM for final review and approvaL. From this
point, a three-year budget was established to cover the expenses of air travel,
accommodation, and sustenance for the various technical exchanges that would take
place to complete the areas of cooperation identified in the protocol agreement.
Our Protocol Agreement identified two major areas of cooperation:
. To review the existing water distribution system for the Municipality of Tubigon
and develop the most efficient and cost effective design that will result in a longer
term alternative that will best serve the residents of the municipality, and
. To develop a strategic plan that will assist in the orderly development of the
community and its economic strengths.
In our situation, however, it should be pointed out that the Protocol Agreement acted
as a minimum guide in terms of areas of cooperation and we have worked hard to
en sure that other areas, not specifically named in the agreement but identified
throughout the technical exchanges, have been initiated and completed as well.
Highlights of the partnership: The Tubigon perspective
ResuIts obtained:
Computerized mod eling of municipal waterworks system (water distribution):
. Installation of a specialized water distribution software and training of sta ff to
operate the software. An experimental model for a section of the system was
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created and was successfully validated. The next move is to create a computer
genera te d system of pipe network that wil improve efficiency and better water
service delivery. This will aid the department in its massive rehabilitation plan for
the antiquated and dilapidated pipe system of the municipality.
. Enhanced technical capability of local staff wil also be beneficial in the extension
of technical assistance to the rural vilages in the field of water distribution.
Municipal administration:
. Strategic Planning: Municipal Vision, Mission and Corporate Values adopted.
Enhanced the capability of local policy makers and managers to prioritized
concerns in management and delivery of basic services.
. Strategic Plan has increased the credibility, stature and profile of the municipality.
. Gained substantial knowledge and input in the areas of zoning, taxation, bu ilding
inspection, building permits and parks and recreational facilities development.
. The organization review that was conducted was embraced by Council with a very
positive outlook and the recommendations in the report were seriously taken into
considera tion.
Community involvement:
Linkages of school children (as pen pals) between the two communities provide an
avenue of lasting friendship for the people of Portage la Prairie and Tubigon.
The organization "Friends of Tubigon" wil also provide a perpetual link even after
the program is terminated and assist in projects/programs outside the realm of the
partnership.
Lessons learned:
. The Partnerships Program has broadened the perspective of local officials in terms
of managing effectively the workings of government. It has opened new
dimensions in priorities for development, policy determination and working
strategies for effective and effcient management of the municipality and the
delivery of basic services.
. Strategic planning sessions will provide direction for the Council and have become
a good management tool for local managers.
. The recommendations in the organizational review report wil provide for a more
substantive policy in personnei development and management.
. Community involvement and support was also a major factor in the course of the
program.
. Working with people from a totally different culture and tradition has enhanced
the capability of local staff to deal with their clients effectively and discharge their
functions more "people friendly" .
Problems encountered:
. Communication: Since Tubigon is a rural community, the exchange of information
can be a nightmare for the foreign partner.
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. Staff participating on a technical visit: adjusting to a different culture, food and
climate.
. For Tubigon, the list of personnei that can work effectively on a technical visit (in a
foreign environment) is short.
Highlights of the partnership: The Portage la Prairie
perspective
Results obtained
. Completion of our two identified areas of cooperation.
. Provision of technical expertise and training in the areas of computer modeling of
the water distribution system using the Watercad software package.
. Provision of computer hardware to assist Tubigon engineering sta ff in utilizing the
water distribution computer modeling system. This funding was provided for
FCM.
. Hands-on work in the development and delivery of the strategic planning proeess
that can and is used at the elected Council and individual Department leveis. Each
Department is now expected to provide an annual work plan using the strategic
planning model that was specifically developed for Tubigon by the Economic and
Community Development Department of the City of Portage laPrairie (in written
form consisting of a workbook and overheads).
The strategi c plan has led to favorable spin-offs including:
. Reinforcement of the municipality's position in efforts to establish an Industrial
Estate/Economic Zone in the community; and
. Beneficial in providing direction during the Economic Estate Development
Workshop conducted by USAID/GOLD.
As well outside communities are impressed that Tubigon has a vision for the future
and a strategic plan for development which has increased the credibility, profile, and
stature of Tubigon.
. The completion of an intern al organizational review that identified 13 specific
areas that the municipal government could con sider for implementation to improve
efficiencies and effectiveness.
. The development of an organization in Portage la Prairie called "FRIENDS OF
TUBIGON" that will be the vehicle to continue a long-term relationship with
Tubigon after the formal conclusion of the FCM Partnership Program.
It should be noted that to date, the Friends of Tubigon have provided some donated
computers for community use; have established linkages between schools in our two
communities with an established pen pal program; and the provision of funds from the
Portage la Prairie Rotary Club to provide cash to assist in the provision of hospital
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equipment for the newly constructed hospital in Tubigon; the establishment of a
linkage between Mater Dei College in Tubigon and St. Boniface College to promote
post secondary education opportunities for Canadians and Filipinos.
. The initiation of developing
developing standards for
developments.
a local building bylaw that will assist Tubigon in
future residential, commercial, and industrial
. The benefit of a greater understanding of local governanee by our City Council
from another culture and again reinforcing the fact that we deal with many of the
same issues.
. The value of learning new skilIs and exchanging ideas with our urban counterparts
offers an excellent opportunity for us to become better managers and municipal
employees in Canada.
Lessons learned
That municipal government issues, concerns, and developments are similar in nature,
regardless of geographical location and the more opportunities available to interact
with others from abroad, the more opportunity for self-improvement that can be
transferred to the local governments that we represent.
. That in order for a partnership to be successful, the individuals involved must gain
a good understanding of each other as people first. Without overcoming this issue,
the ability to complete your identified areas of cooperation will be that much more
difficult to accomplish.
~ In the case of Tubigon and Portage la Prairie, we tru ly like and respect each other
as individuals and this has opened the door to personal friendships which has
made our jobs easier in terms of accomplishing what we set out to do.
~ When technical exchanges occur, individuals are exposed to the families of those
persons involved and we encourage as much community involvement as we can
fit onto our work schedules as is possible.
~ In this manner, the individuals involved in the technical exchanges get a better
feel for how day to day life is in another country which enlightens us as to how
similar we really are as people.
~ Out of everything we have done with the program, this is an area that we are
extremely proud of and is like ly the reason that we have not experienced a single
problem throughout the life of the partnership to date, which is remarkable.
. y ou will only get out of the partnership what you put in to it. Both parties have to
work at the relationship and be considerate of each other's needs and well being.
This is critical for success.
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. That all of us have the ability and wilingness to serve others as municipal
government employees and it is worth noting the good feeling that one gets when
you help others and learn more about our fellow persons.
Problems encountered:
. We are very pleased to report that there were no real problems to speak of. The
only area that presented some problem was facsimile transmissions that sometimes
did not get to Tubigon and vice versa due to poor weather conditions.
In order to alleviate this problem, we would recommend communication via Internet
email wherever possible.
Tubigon is currently investigating this possibility and hopes to be on-line by April of
1999. The accomplishment of this task wil go a long way in ensuring that we can
exchange information and £iles electronically and frankly, be connected for a lifetime.
Conclusion
Our participation in the FCM Partnership Program has truly been one of the most
enlightening and enriching experiences for me personally.
Not only have I had the opportunity to become involved in transferring our skils and
knowledge to others involved in municipal government and learn from them as well,
but also I have had the opportunity to meet and work with some quality people like:
. Mr. Mascarinas who has been a pillar of support for the program in Tubigon and
truly an inspiration to all that work with him,
. Mr. Noel Mendana, my counterpart in Tubigon who is instrumental in keeping the
program moving ahead administrativelyand himself a lea der in local governanee
who is committed to assisting his community grow and pro sper,
. Current Tubigon Mayor Paulo Lasco and Vice-Mayor Renato Viliber who have
worked hard after the recent local elections in Tubigon to ensure that the new
Council is informed about the benefits of the FCM Program to en sure continuance
for potentially another two years,
. Former Mayor of Portage la Prairie Glenn Carlson whose vision inspired us all to
become involved in this program in the first place and who is one of the biggest
supporters of Canadian involvement in programs of this nature,
. FCM staff Basile Gilbert and Shirley-Ann Bowles who have been of such great
assistance in assisting both our communities whenever required,
. Our City Council, Administration, and staff for their support, effort and
understanding of the importanee of this program.
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W orking with a program such as this one developed by FCM is tru ly a privilege and a
rewarding experience for us as individuals, for the community's we work in, and in a
broader perspective, contributing in a small way to greater world good.
On behalf of Mr. Mascarinas and myself, we would like to thank FCM and our
Bergen hosts for the opportunity to share our partnership experiences with you and
look forward to inter-acting with you throughout the balanee of the program.
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Institutional twinning experience of the Ethiopian
Red Cross
TENNA MENGISTU, FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL, ETHIOPIAN RED CROSS
Background
The massive drought famine of the mid-98s in Ethiopia had such a huge magnitude of
adversity that it is still remembered as a powerful reminiscent of 'the biblical famine' in
a modern setting. The drought disaster, exacerbated by increasing poverty and cIvil
strife, caused untold human suffering as a result of which as many as one milion
victims lost their lives while several more millions were dispossessed of their basic
means of survival and livelihoods.
On the positive side of the picture, the huge human suffering caused by the massive
drought famine triggered a spiral of altruism and attracted humanitarian responses
from far and wide. The level of generosity and solidarity expressed by the international
community was pitched at a sea le that had never been recorded in the history of the
country.
The Ethiopian Red Cross (ERCS) had to rise to the occasion and bolster up its
humanitarian response capacities. For the first time in its entire history, the Society had
to, face up to the challenge of assisting as many as one milion victims providing them
with food on a monthly basis which, in many cases also included clothing, medicines,
and shelter - a considerable degree of achievement even by global standards within the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement presently consisting of about
175 member National Societies.
The evolution of the concept and practice of twinning
In relation to the extension of Red Cross humanitarian value chain and
mandate
The concept and practice of Twinning within the ERCS grew out of the Society's desire
to build up on the favourable environment of solidarity and support genera te d in
response to the massive drought famine of the mid-1980s and the human suffering it
caused on unprecedented scale. The manifestation of the drought with its devastating
effects in 1984/85 was, by and large, seen to be a function of a chronic development
failure characterised by a long proeess of environmental degradation and related
problems. Much as the generous emergency response was honourable within the limits
of life-saving imperatives, there was a growing realisation that it was n.ot sufficient to
create the basis for sustainable development that can build up community coping
capacities against future disasters of both man-made and natural origin.
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As a learning spin-off from the devastating effects of the Ethiopian drought famine of
the mid-80s, the moral dilemma faced by emergency relief ageneies including the Red
Cross gave rise to the following question of fundamental concern:
Can disaster, related to drought and famine, be prevented as long as the
vulnerable communities remain perpetually squeezed within what can be
referred to as the PHD (poverty, hunger and diseases) trap?
As far as the ERCS was concerned, the end for the drought emergency phase ushered
in the beginning of a whole new set of mission objectives in terms of what the Society
ought to be doing beyond the emergency phase in response to thepreparedness and
prevention needs of the most vulnerable comInunities. This necessitated the evolution
of Twinning as a new form of partnership to help expand the Red Cross humanitarian
value chain and mandate in the direction of 'prevention is better than cure'.
In relation to the changing mode of operation and cross-culturallearning
The organisational structure and management culture of the ERCS had to be
substantially transformed in order to accommodate the widening mission objectives of
the Society including the newareas of enga gement designe d to improve the coping
capacities of the vulnernable people. The institutional implication of this change
focused on the system-wide transformation of the conventional operating mode of the
ERCS and of its twinning partners from a proeess of caring and sharing based on
donor-recipient relationships into a higher form of partnership based on
interdependenee and cross-cultural learning.
The institutional change required during the immediate phase of the post-drought
disaster in the 1980s was also a result of a historical coincidence. The 1980s represent
the decade when the ERCS was doing all in its powers to heighten its visibility with a
concerted effort to build up broad-based constituency including country-w ide
territorial coverage and membership strength ensuring a greater participation of the
mass of the population.
Objectives
The Twinning Partnership is based on the following: three basic objectives.
. The promotion of people to people direct contact to enhance cross-cultural learning
and international understanding.
. The retention and redirection of the very high momentum of international
solidarity genera te d during the drought emergency operation of the mid-1980s in
favour of bu ilding up:
~the coping capacities of the vulnerable communities in terms of drought disaster
prevention and preparedness
~the institutional capacities of the ERCS in terms of decentralised management
including the branch and sub-branch network development.
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Scope and approach
More than 20, out of the existing 31, branches of the ERCS are currently by the
Twinning Partnership. The general model follows a proeess of partnership established
between the branchesof the ERCS and the branches of sister National Societies, with
participating National Societies including the Belgian, British, Danish, Finnish,
German, Icelandic, Korean (South), Netherlands and Swedish Red Cross Societies.
In some cases, the form of Twinning Partnership does not follow the general model
based on a branch to branch counterpart arrangement. However, although, for
purposes of practical necessity, a National Society, e.g. the South Korean National
Society works with the ERCS branch/es, the fundamental principle remains the same,
i.e. the dynamics of decentralised organisation and management is, from the viewpoint
of the ERCS, what governs the proeess of twinning in all respects.
The essenee of the modus operandi is based on the progressive transfer of
responsibility and authority, in terms of decision mak ing and accountability, from the
centre to the lowest echelons of the National Society, with the role of the headquarters
limited to one of co-ordination and facilitation.
Assessment of results
In terms of building up institutional capacities
Based on the direct branch to branch communication, the Twinning Partnership marks
a departure in the organisation and management culture of the ERCS and of its
twinning partners in terms of the emphasis it places on decentralisation. This has
improved the chances for better programme impact and sustainability through a
proeess of empowerment of the beneficiaries as primary stakeholders in the whole
gamut of planning and implementation of programmes and services.
The Twinning Partnership has significantly contributed to the broad-based
constituency building of the ERCS. As it stands today, the Society is regarded as one of
the strongest on the Continent with a network of 31 branches, 33 sub-branches, more
than 1,500 local Red Cross Committees with a membership strength of about 500,000
adult and about 100,000 youth members. The two branches of the ERCS (Arsi and
North Soa) twinned with the two branches of the Swedish Red Cross (Gothenburg and
Kalmar) account for more than half of the total membership of the National Society.
Establishment of a minimum threshold for 'core cost self-reliance' defines part of the
focus of the Twinning Partnership. Some of the income genera ting initiatives in this
respect include a real estate development, flour mils, oil mils, bakeries, coffee
plantations etc., being implemented according to a general set of criteria that
emphasises the need to ensure that all income genera ting initiatives do not contra diet
the basic Red Cross values and principles. Most of the twinned branches have
developed the necessary financial capacity that can enable them to finanee their core
costs (including salaries for co re sta ff and administrative costs).
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The increasing international understanding genera te d through the mechanism of the
Twinning Partnership has helped to evolve a new way of looking at development not
as a proeess wheresome are represented as developers and others as developees but as
a collective enterprise that requires nothing less than genuine commitment and shared
vision among all concerned.
In terms of cross-cultural Jearning and international understand ing, a num ber of
exchange visits have been undertaken involving both volunteers and sta ff working in
the twinned branches. This has been cherished as a successful and value-adding proeess
for a n umber of reasons:
First, it has helped the ERCS to keep up vol unte er interest and commitment especially
among volunteers running the governanee machinery of the Society at branch and sub-
branch leveis. This represents an important achievemènt in the Ethiopian context
where voluntarism tends to be a rare virtue which only few can afford to embrace due
to the dire socio-economic needs which render the issue of daily survival a matter of
full time engagement.
Second, the power of moti va ti on and inspiration genera te d by the exchange visits has
also worked as a positive factor in curing the high turnover of the employed sta ff of
the ERCS. The problem of high turnover persists due to the less competitive benefit
package provided by the Society as a result of which its capacity to retain experienced
sta ff remains to be limited.
Third, based on interdependenee and cross-cultural learning, the exchange visits have
also proved to be useful in terms of positively influencing the behaviour and
contribution of volunteers and staff of partner Societies and their branches. This has,
among others, satisfied 'the hunger' for some sort of hand-son experience based on the
conviction that 'seeing is believing'.
Societies and their branches. This has among others, satisfied 'the hunger' for some
sort of hand-on experience based on the conviction that 'seeing is believing'.
Circumventing the physical and emotional distance between the partners, it has helped
to dampen the threat of the so-called phenomenon of 'compassion fatigue' inherently
embedded in the rather opaque and intransparent nature of the conventional forms of
co-operation based on donor-recipient relationships. The deeper sen se of international
understanding engendered in the proeess has, it can even be argued, created the 'gene'
for what has come to be referred to as 'global citizenship', with profound implications
for the unit y of humanity in principle as well as in practice.
Fourth, the exchange visits have substantially contributed to the development of a
culture of 'learning by doing'. This is particularly the case when volunteers and/or
employed staff are assigned to work with their twinning partners for a longer duration
of time which, in most cases, represents a proeess of apprenticeship and mentorship.
The contribution this makes to institutional capacity bu ilding cannot be
overemphasised, as the value generated through learning by doing is something that
can hardly be acquired through other forms of learning including academic learning.
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Fifth, cross-cultural learning has also been enhanced through the series of joint reviews
and evaluations of programmes and services designed and implemented under the
umbrella of the Twinning Partnership. This has genera te d auseful proeess of debate
and dialogue with a considerable benefit for both sides. The ERCS branches and sub-
branches are, as the main operational partners, constantly challenged to improve their
performanee standards in all respects to live up to the expectation of their partners
who emphasise the issue of 'value for money' as a key area of concern. Their partners
are also confronted with the reality of having to come to terms as regards the need to
temper the demand for excessive reporting and watertight accountability which may
not be feasible especially where the operational environment is unwieldy and complex.
In terms of fifting up the coping capacities of the vulnerable communities
Apart from the benefit genera te d in terms of raising awareness regarding the need to
empower the beneficiaries as primary stakeholders through a decentralised proeess of
organisation and management, the Twinning Partnership has helped to expand the
range of deliverables with a focus on the idea of 'prevention is better than cure'. The
purpose is to contribute to the proeess of reduction of poverty and vulnerability, with
the selected set of activities induding, inter alia,
. water and sanitation focusing on springs (to provide access to dean drinking water)
and development of public latrines (:: 80 percent of the population have no access
to water and sanitation facilities/services
. reafforestation focusing on development of nurseries and tree planting for both
environmental protection (o: 3 percent of the country is under forest cover) and
income generation purposes to strengthen the self-financing capacity at branch and
sub-branch level
. community based health care focusing on training of traditional birth attendants,
establishment of community health posts, dissemination of health education, etc. (::
50 percent of the population have no access to health services and facilities)
Impact
The institutional and community capacity building experience gained from the
Twinning Partnership is one of the factors that has infused the glamour for change and
development within the ERCS focusing on decentralisation, self-reliance and grassroots
level development. The intention is to transform the Society into a well-functioning
National Society with broad-based foundation, solid capacities and credible
performance in all respects. The awareness that has been generated in terms of the
need to start domestie twinning between and among the ERCS branches and sub-
branches is also a step in the right direction in terms of sustainability of impact.
In a wider con text, the disaster preparedness and prevention policy of the government,
which came into effect at the beginning of the 1990s, is partly attributable to the
mitigation and disaster prevention focus of the Twinning Partnership and the
contribution it makes to the rising awareness of this respect.
The national policy on disaster prevention and preparedness represents a fundamental
departure as regards the every high importanee it attaches to rehabilitative, promotive
and preventive work with a provision for preparedness and response as and when it is
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called for. The policy highlights the need to treat relief and development as inseparable
elements. It also underpins the importanee of using, to the extent possible, relief
resources in such away that they reduce vulnerabilities and promote local capacities
with a focus on sustainable recovery and longer term development.
Risks
The dimension of exchange visits that involves the youth has suffered a set-back, as
youth exchange programme participants from the ERCS of ten refuse to return after
visiting countries in Europe as part of the Twinning exchange scheme. This poses a
threat against the integrity of the system and undermines the va lue of institutional
learning.
On the other hand, as much as the youth representing the motor force in the
operationalisation of the Twinning Partnership, the possibility of excluding them from
the programme of exchange visits can be an option that turns out to be practically and
morally inexpedient. The obvious danger of such an option is that it wil profoundly
affect the Twinning Partnership as a system without future gate-keepers for the
knowledge that accrues through cross cultural learning.
In order to create an environment of balanced development, the National Society of
the ERCS intends to ensure that all its branches are in one way or another covered
through the Twinning Partnership. As this ambition could not be realised in view of
the limited number of partners, the issue of rotation has been considered as the second
best option.
However, experience shows that once a Twinning is starte d in a given branch, the
growing sen se of fellowship that binds the partners renders the proeess of exit and
rotation rather difficult. In most ca ses, the conditions for exit are not clearly spelled
out at the poim of emry and there is always a wide opening for an 'unfinished agenda'
to be dealt with before the issue of exit can be addressed. From the National SocIety's
poim of view, the issue, then, becomes not one of 'how to go about it' but one of 'how
to come out of it'.
In away, resistance to exit can, at one and the same time, be seen as an indicator of
risk and a factor of success. It may be considered an indicator of risk as much as it
tends to concentrate the benefit of the Twinning Partnership. However, it can also be
viewed as a factor of success as long as it is an outcome of the growing understanding
between the partners sharing the same visions and challenges.
The learning framework
The experience of the Twinning Partnership within the Ethiopia Red Cross Society can
be pulled together to provide a postulate by way of learning framework.
In a macro-economic context with deep rooted poverty and vulnerability, the apparent
end of an emergency crisis of the type that affected Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, tends to
generate a qualitative change as regards the need for more sustained collaborative
efforts to combat the root eau ses of poverty and vulnerability. This wil be likely to be
the case even if the crisis is seen to be receding.
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The desire to join forces through post-emergency and development-oriented
collaborative efforts ten d to metamorphose into a proeess of cross-cultural learning
and international understanding which helps to re-examine the concept and practice of
development not as a proeess where some are represented as developers and others as
developees but as a collective enterprise of all stakeholders sharing the same visions
and concerns.
The increasing awareness in favour of sustained collaborative efforts to genera te a
proeess of development and better coping capacities leads to a twin-tracked strategy
that encompasses both dimensions of institutional capacity building and community
development.
Implemented in a form of Twinning Partnership, such an effort is likely to provide a
workable model through which both aspects of institutional and community capacity
development are addressed in a balanced and harmonious manner. This has helped to
ensure that the proeess of institutional development (of ten representing less
economistic and less tangible categories) is seamlessly combined with the proeess of
community development (representing economistic and more tangible categories).
As long as the global and national macro-economic con text continues to be
characterised by the sharp and deep di vide between the rich and the poor, micro-level
efforts to develop a proeess of partnership, based on interdependenee and cross
cultural learning, are likely to face countervailing tendeneies that purport to make the
proeess look like 'a partnership of unequals'. This related to the problem of recurring
defection by the ERCS youth volunteers participating in the exchange programme after
a visit to some of the countries in Europe. Evidently, what acts as the dominant force
here is the growing 'wave' that perpetuate the perception that 'the grass is greener on
the other side of the fenee'.
The challenge this poses for micro-level partnerships relates to the need to evolve a
new dimension of outlook as an antidote to the so-called 'the grass ...on the other
side...' mode of thinking. The obvious reason is that poverty is not only a matter of
lack of material goods and services, but also a function of the state of mind. It also
underscores the need to emphasise attitudinal change as a component part of cross-
cultural learning with a dimension of development education that can help 'decolonise
the mind' and increase self confidence.
In principle, both institutional and community capacity development components need
to be treated as inseparable features of a non-dichotomous proeess. Strategically,
however, the learning framework should also capture the need to ensure that cross
cultural learning takes the centre stage as the dominant model that drives the Twinning
Partnership.
This paves the way for unlearning what has been learned in terms of de-emphasising
institutional capacity building and cross cultural learning as intangible factors of non-
critical importanee as opposed to community development components that are of ten
considered as factors of critical importanee with a package of economic benefits of a
more tangible nature. It is important to note that learning organisations emphasise the
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value of learning to the point of asserting its central it y that, transforming into a force
of knowledge and wisdom, it can account up to 70 percent of their total asset worth -
an assertion which helps to recognise the value of institutional development
components as important factors of mainstream development thinking and practice.
In a practical sense, such an approach wil help circumvent the problem of rotation,
experienced by the ERCS within the Twinning Partnership, and ensure a balanced
branch development strategy based on national priorities. The community capacity
component of the Twinning Partnership may have a life cycle of phasing-in, scaling up
and phasing out. However, the institutional capacity building part of it, based on
cross-cultural learning and international understand ing, may not follow the same
cycle. Not necessarily...
Once launched and developed to a certain extent, the dimension of Twinning
Partnership that focuses on the proeess of cross-cultural learning and international
understanding, as a conduit for increasing knowledge and wisdom, needs to be seen as
a dynamic and eternal relationship with no terminal point in time and span.
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Twinning of institutions: Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD) and National Directorate for
Coal and Hydrocarbons (DNCH), Mozambique
CARLOS J. ZACARIAS, PETROLEUM GEOLOGIST, DNCH AND PER BLYSTAD, SENIOR
GEOLOGIST NPD
Development of the petroleum sector in Mozambique
. Exploration activity started in 1950s, up to day more than 60 wells have been
driled onshore and offshore
. As aresult discoveries: Pande Gas Field, Buzi, Temane
. Gas resources
- Overall onshore and offshore potential 25 TCF in place
- Pande: Proven reserves: 1,85 TCF recoverable gas
- Temane: Proven potential 1,2 TCF recoverable gas
. Oil resources
- Potential uncertain, offshore most promising
- Currently deep-water exploration ongoing
. Licensees today BP, Arco/SasollZarara, Norbay, Lonropet, Enron, Scimitar-Zarara
Development of the gas resources in Mozambique
. Pande Field discovered in 1961 - no gas mark et existed in the region
. After end of civil war in Mozambique in 1992 and apartheid regime in RSA 1992,
it was possible to utilise natural gas regionally (Pande, Mozambique and Kudu,
Namibia)
. Wodd Bank East African Gas development project allowed Pande to be developed
in regional industrial project (initially iron reduction plan in Palhaborwa, RSA,
now steel plant in Maputo (MISP-project)
. Pilot project small scale local gas utilisation for power generation in Vilanculos and
Inhassoro areas, funded by Norad
. Potential market for gas in Mozambique
- Industrial and domestie market in Maputo
- Gas pipeline to Beira for iron reduction plant and the free zone
- Gas pipeline to RSA
- Gas to rural areas along pipeline
National institutions in the petroleum sector
. Empresa NacIonal Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) established 1981 as national state oil
company
. ENH had dual function: regulatory role and commercial role until1994
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. Due to reorganisation of the sector National Directorate for Coal and
Hydrocarbons (DNCH) was created in 1994 under the Ministry of Mineral
Resources and Energy (MIREME)
. DNCH to act as supervisory and regulatory body and ENH to play commercial
role on behalf of the state
DNCH key governanee functions
. Establish sovereignty
. Establish institutional system
. Establish legal and regulatory framework and revise petroleum law
. Make policies and perform sector planning
. Promote acreage
. Issue licenses, contracts, approvals and consents
. Collect taxes, royalties and le vies
. Perform supervision and control of petroleum operations and activities
. Make resource assessments
. National petroleum data management
. Information
Assistance provided to DNCH
. Establish legallregulatory framework
. Policy/licensing strategy
. Promotion and negotiation of licensing
. Supervision of petroleum operations
. Resource assessment and data management
. Institutional support
- training
- advisory service
- office equipment and communication
DNCH experience with twinning programme
Positive
. Direct co-operation between institutions in Mozambique and Norway an efficient
way to transfer know-how and experience
. Necessary to have expert permanently posted in the initial phase of project
. Benefit from training programmes and on job training assignments in NPD
. Twinning programme gives opportunity to have access to high dass consultant
service
. Technical and financial evaluation work of the feasibility studies of the Pande and
MISP projects
Negative
. Problems with co-ordination of activities due to lack of human resources and
experience
. Due to bureaucracy in Mozambican system, 1 year delay in signing of the country
agreements
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. Bank transfer delayed due to unclear/lack of procedures
. DNCH may sometimes be regarded as being under direction/control by a foreign
organisation
. Dependenee on twinning institution to design/perform programmes if internal
competence will not be developed
Recommendationjsuggestions
. Continue the basic concept of the twinning programme
. Medium term job assignment in NPD could be performed under twinning
programme to cater for:
- Resource management
- Safety and environment management
Norwegian assistance to petroleum sector in Mozambique
. Norwegian assistance through Norad, total amount 115 mill NOK (1997-2001)
. NPD active since 1980
. Norad support to petroleum sector since 1983
- Data acquisition, proeessing and interpretation
- Training
- Institutional support
- Exploration
- Equipment and consumption material
- Supervision and monitoring of petroleum operations and negotiations
- Gas utilisation and transport studies
. Evaluation of ENH Gas Reserve Report in 1991 and 1993
- New depositional and sei smie model, upgrading reserve estimate by 50 %
. Preliminary engineering study
Co-operation in petroleum sector
. Phase 1: 1983-1995: ENH
- Mostly technical assistance, consultant contracted by ENH
. Phase Il: 1995- : DNCH
- Enable Mozambique to manage its petroleum resources ensunng national
interests
- Institutional cooperation between NPD and DNCH was established to support
DNCH to perform key government functions
- NPD identified and contracted a consultant which is responsible for the major
part of the project
Lessons learned - organisation of project
. Roles
- The roles of all parties should be clearly defined
- Acceptthat a directorate is not a consultant: can exercise different roles.
(Assessmen t -p lanning - implemen ta tion)
- The directorate does not have a commercial interest in runn ing project activities
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- NPD's role in Norway may be in conflict with active participation in DNCH's
tasks
. Responsibility
- Recipient responsibility:
· Recipients ability to manage the financial matters are important for
economic security
· If ability is low, the recipient organisation may be given full responsibility
after an interim period, like the hand-over of operatorship for licences in
petroleum business
- T echnical programme:
· NPD responsible. Norad should have adequate knowledge of petroleum
sector but leave the technical part to NPD
- Project financing and con tro L
· Norad responsible
- Coordination with other donor ageneies
· Norad responsible
. Project period
- 3 years common, THIS is TOO SHORT!
- Legal and regulatory matters need more than 3 years to be developed and
implemented
- Recruitment and training. Availability of sta ff bottleneck. Salary schemes
constraint
- Need time to develop good relationships in cooperating organisation and
government
- Norad and recipient country wil normally not be able to enable continued
support without discontinuity. Experienced 1-2 years delay in new programme
approval when NPD and consultant shouldered the cost. Particularly regarding
renewal of the country to country agreement
- 5-tears programme with mi d-term review more flexible and re source-sa ving
. Expert on-site
- Pro
· Enable quicker and better support on a daily basis. Co st efficient
· Establish good link to NPD home office
· Knowledge about and easier access to local experts and regional consultants
- Cons
· Depending on person
. Expert off-site
- Pro
· Flexible. Can use different experts
- Cons
· Expensive
· Personal contacts not easily established
· More coordination, can make delays in programme
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Lessans learned - selection of personneI from NPD
. Pick the right persons
- Technical expertise, socIal skill and interest
. Preparation
- Transfer of experience
- Preparation through Norad courses
. Brief expert visits
- Ensure enough time
. Results of evaluations and interpretations
- Publish if possible, creates self-confidence and network
. T rainee
- Enable young/new sta ff to familiarise with international projects. Cost to be
covered outside the project
Lessans learned
. Cultural differences
- Not encountered major problems
Benefits for NPD
. International project used in sta ff development aspect
- Challenging both professionally and personally
- Experience new problems, widen horizon
- Self-experience best tool to understand the ne ed for development assistance
- Create professional and personal relationships: networking
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Institutional Partnership and Twinning: An Effective
Mechanism to Promote Institutional Development?
FINAL PROGRAMME
The Bergen Seminar on Development 2-3 March 1999
I Monday 1 March:
Afternoon/ evening Arrival of participants
19:00 Reception (informal)
20:00 Dinner
I Tuesday 2 March:
09:00 Officialopening:
Welcome by Henrik J. Lisæth, Managing Director, Chr.
Michelsen Institute
Political Advisor to Norway's Minister of International
Development and Human Rights Mr. Olav Kjørven: Why does
Norway promote twinning for institutional development?
Plenary Session:
09:30 Presentation of participants and short introduction to the Seminar
Arve Ofstad, Senior Research Fellow, Chr. Michelsen Institute
09:45 Keynote Speaker:
Professor Rehman Sobhan, Centre for Policy Dialogue,
Bangladesh:
Re-assessing aid: The role of governance, institution building and
partnership - Learning from the Asian experience
10:30 Coffee break
10:45 Keynote Speaker:
Kim Forss, Andante - tools for thinking AB, Sweden: Institutional
development, institutional co-operation, partnerships, twinning
and joint ventures - So many concepts: What are the issues?
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11:15
13:30
14:45-16:30
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Three cases of institutional twinning: Highlighting the
experiences, results obtained, problems encountered, and lessons
learned from the proeess:
Case 1 - State institutions: Twinning of Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD) with National Directorate for Coal and
Hydrocarbons (DNCH), Mozambique:
Per Blystad, Senior Geologist (NPD) Stavanger and
Carlos j. Zacarias, Petroleum Geologist (DNCH) Maputo
Case 2 - Non-government organisations: Institutional twinning
experiences of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society:
Christoph Müller, Director (Institutional and Resource
Development Department) International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and
Tanna Mengistu, former Secretary-General of Ethiopian Red
Cross Society
Case 3 - Locallevel Government: Twinning of municipalities in
Canada (Portage la Prairie) and the Philippines (Tubigon) through
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities:
S. Dean Yaremchuk, Director, Economic and Community
Development, City of Portage la Prairie, Canada and
former Mayor Eufasio Mascarinas, Municipality of Tubigon,
Philippines
Lunch break
ParaBel Group Sessions (mixed participation):
The objective of the group sessions is to review and recommend
good practices and good policies. The groups should highlight
important lessons and identify important constraints and
limitations, while focussing on positive practical experiences.
Group 1: Incentives and "ownership". When is "partnership" a
realistie concept? What are the incentives that create ownership
and self-interest among various partners? - Is this different for
municipalities, NGOs and the private sector?
Moderator: Inge Tvedten, Senior Research Fellow,
Chr. Michelsen Institute
Group 2: The larger context for organisational cooperation and
institutional development: How can organisational cooperation
(OC) promote institutional development (ID) at large, and how
relevant is OC for institutional reforms and policy changes? How
can ID be improved within an OC concept?
Moderator: Cathryn Thorup, Director, Office of Development
Partners, us Agency for International Development - USAID
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Group 3: Measurable objectives and evaluations. Can the
expected objectives of OC be clarified, and how can results be
measured? - What are the success criteria, and what makes an
OC sustainable?
Moderator: Erik Berg, Head of Evaluation Section, Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Group 4: Alternatives to twinning? - When is twinning preferable
to alternative modalities such as regular technical assistance, and
when is it not? - Do we need different "models" for different
situations? - Is twinning a form of tied aid?
Moderator: Indumathi Rao, Regional Director, Community
Based Rehabilitation Network, Bangalore, India
16:30-16:45 Coffee break
16:45-18:00 Plenary Session: Chaired by Stein Erik Kruse, Senior Consultant,
Centre for Partnership in Development/DiS
Conclusions and recommendations from the group sessions
Comments from participants. Discussion
19:00 D inner
21:00 Norwegian evening
I Wednesday 3 March:
09:15 Organisational development, organisation theory and practices in
North and South. What can modem theory tell the practitioners?
Speaker: Professor Peter Blunt, Chair in Management, Business
Graduate School, Northern Territory University, Australia
Plenary debate: questions and comments
11:15 Coffee/tea available
11:15-12:30 Parallei Group Sessions - 4 functional groups:
What is the expected role of the aid officials (in the North and
South), the collaborating institutions, and the research
community? What do we expect from each other? Who takes the
initiatives; who is responsible for progress? What can each one do
to promote sustainable institutions?
Group A: Practitioners in twinned institutions (South)
Moderator: Mahesh Chandra, Technical Director, National
Informatics Centre, India
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Group B: Practitioners in twinned institutions (North)
Moderator: Aina Bergström, Senior Programme Consultant,
Redd Barna, Norway
Group C: Aid officials / donors
Moderator: Ole Petter Opsand, Advisor
(Institutional Development) NORAD, Norway
Group D: Researchers and evaluators
Moderator: Anneke Slob, Policies and Operations Evaluation
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands
12:30 Lunch break
13:30 Plenary session
Short presentation of gro up session recommendations
14:00-15:30 Panel debate on the future of twinning and partnership for
institutional development. Chaired by Senior Research Fellow
Arve Ofstad, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Partici pants:
. Ms. Heather Baser, Senior Advisor, Technical Cooperation/
CapacIty Development, Canadian International Development
Agency
. (Professor Elliot j. Berg, independent consultant, Visiting
Professor at Université de Auvergne, former Professor at
University of Michigan, and former Vice-President of
Development Alternatives Inc.) "
. Mr. Apollinaire Ndorukwigira, Principal Programme Officer,
African Capacity Building Foundation
. Ms. Ingrid Ofstad, Director, Technical Department, NORAD
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
. Dr. Moh'd Haflah Piei, Deputy Director, Malaysia Institute of
Economic Research
15:30 Departures (depending on airline connections)
" Professor Elliot J. Berg was unable to participate due to sudden illness.
l, l, The following item had to be cancelled due to time constraints:
. Brief presentation of recent evaluations of institutional development and twinning:
. Norway: Stein Erik Kruse, Senior Consultant, Centre for Partnership in
Development/DiS
. Netherlands: Anneke Slo b, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department,
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
. United Kingdom: Pauline Hayes, Government and Institutions Advisor,
Department for International Development, UK
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I Speakers and resource persons
Rehman Sobhan has been a Professor in the Dept. of Economics, Dhaka University,
Member, Bangladesh Planning Commission, Director General, BIDS and Member of
the Advisory Council of the President of Bangladesh in charge of the Ministry of
Planning and the Economic Relations Division. He is today the Executive Chairman,
Centre for Policy Dialogue. He has served as Envoy Extraordinary with special
responsibility for Economic Affairs, Govt. of Bangladesh during 1971, as President,
Bangladesh Economic Association, as a Member, UN Committee for Development
Planning, as a Member, Governing Council of the UN University, Tokyo, as a Member
of the Board of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva,
and as a Member of the Executive Committee of the International Economic
Association. He was recently elected as Chairman of the Board of Grameen Bank and
was a Member of the Group of Eminent Persons, set up by the SAARC Heads of State
to review the future of SAARC. He has authored a large number of books and papers
in the area of public enterprise, privatisation, agrarian reform, aid dependence, South
Asian cooperation, analysing structural adjustment reforms and on governance.
Kim Forss holds a Ph.D. degree from the Stockholm School of Economics. His
research field is evaluation studies as well as organisational/institutional development,
with a particular emphasis on international cooperation. He has published several
research papers on international organisations, and he has participated in institutional
development projects as a consultant and researcher. In recent years he has worked on
the development of methodologies in meta eva lua ti on and participatory evaluation. He
has also cultivated a special interest in organisation reform and change proeesses in
complex political organisational systems.
Carlos Zacarias is a Petroleum Geologist and joined the National Directorate for Coal
and Hydrocarbons (DNCH) when this was established in 1994. He has been in volve d
in many current DNCH activities including revision of the legal framework,
supervision of exploration activities, and the programme for development of the
petroleum sector funded by NORAD.
Per Blystad is a Senior Petroleum Geologist and has worked on exploration and
concession rounds with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) since 1983. From
1990 to 1995 he was the NORAD Project Coordinator within NPD, and since
1996/97 he was posted as Project Coordinator in the Coordinating Committee for
Coastal and Offshore Geo-science Programmes in East and Southeast Asia (CCOP).
From 1998 he was worked primarily with prognosis and resource assessments.
S. Dean Yaremchuk is currently the Director of Economic and Community
Development for the City ofPortage la Prairie, Manitoba, Canada and has held that
position for the past seven years. As the Canadian local co-ordinator for the
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) Partnership Program with Tubigon, Mr.
Yaremchuk has been directly involved in all components of this project since
inception. With over 19 years of municipal government experience, primarily in
economic development, recreation and parks, and land use planning, Mr. Yaremchuk
provides a broa d range of experiences and skilIs to the partnership programme and has
been instrumental in the success of the programme to date.
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Eufrasio Mascarinas was the Municipal Mayor in Tubigon for more than 20 years. He
is currently elected to the Bohol Provincial Board as a representative for the Tubigon
region, where his focus now is broa der for the greater good at the provincial leveL. Mr.
Mascarinas was instrumental in attraeting the FCM Partnership program to Tubigon
and has until his recent election to the Provincial Board, been involved on a day to day
basis in ensuring the success of the programme.
Peter Blunt is Professor of Management, and holds the Foundation Chair in Business
at the Northern Territory University in Darwin, Australia. He has also held tenured
full professorships in university business schools in Norway and the United Kingdom,
and is best known internationally for his work on problems of organisation and
management in developing countries. On three occasions he held European Union
Visiting Professorial Fellowships at the (then) China,.Europe Management Institute in
Beijing. He is the author or co-author of nine books, three edited collections of essays
and more than fifty articles in refereed journais, and sits on the editorial boards of
Public Administration and Development, The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science,
and The International Journal of Human Resource Management. His most recent
publications include works commissioned by UNDP entitled Re-conceptualising
Governance (1997, with D. Rondinelli), and Public Sector Management, Governance
and Sustainable Human Development (1995). He is an experienced international
management consultant who has undertaken projects in more than 25 countries for
public and private sector clients and international organisations such as AusAID, Sida,
UNDP, Bata, Citibank and the East Asiatie Company. He has lived and worked in
Kenya and Zambia. Late last year he completed (with Merrick Jones) a study for Sida
entitled Twinning as a Method of Capacity Building. He is currently working on a
major project for UNDP entitled, A Forward-Looking Assessment of UNDP's Global
Cooperation Framework, which will be completed in late February this year. His
senior management experience (much of it involving corporate turnaround and new
business development) includes periods as Dean of University faculties, Executive
Directorships of several medium-sized private sector companies in Australia, and the
current Chairmanship of a newly-established equity joint-venture in Indonesia.
Apollinaire Ndorukwigira from Burundi is the Principal Programme Officer in the
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), based in Harare, Zimbabwe. ACBF
was established in 1991 by the World Bank and supported by UNDP and bilateral
donors, with the aim of developing, strengthening, and rehabilitating human and
institutional capacity in Africa, primarily for macroeconomic policy analysis and
development management. It is now an independent foundation and supports more
than thirty institutes, a number of training programmes and research projects. It is
actively involved in supporting Partnership for Capacity Building.
74
C M I
List of participants (alphabeticallist)
S. Amarasekara
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Heather Baser
Elliot J. Berg
Erik Berg
Aina Bergström
Alain Berranger
Peter Blunt
Director General, Regional Development
Ministry of Plan Implementation and Parliamentary Affairs
Colombo, Sri Lanka. e-mail: dgdrr(gslt.lk
Associate Professor
University of Bergen, Department of Administration and
Organization Theory, Christiesgt. 17, N-5007 Bergen, Norway.
Tel: +47 55582474. Fax: +47 5532 1289. e-mail: steinar.askvik(g
aorg. uib.no
Deputy Head of Department, Technical Cooperation Personnei
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2, Asiatisk Plads, DK-1448
Copenhagen K, Denmark. Tel: +45-3392 0000. Fax: +45-3392
1650. e-mail: stibar(gum.dk
Senior Advisor, Technical Co-operation, Capacity Development
Canadian International Development Agency (Cida), 200
Promenade du Portage, Hull (Québec), Canada K1A OG4. Tel:
+1-819 997 1597. Fax: +1-819 997 9049. e-mail:
hea ther _baser(gacdi -eida .gc.ca
Professor
309 Green Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-4317, USA, Tel: + 1-
703-684-8517. e-mail: ejberg(gaol.com
Head of Division (Evaluation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Planning and Evaluation Staff,
P.O.Box 8114 Dep, N-0032 Oslo, Norway (At present:
Councellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dhaka, Bangladesh)
Senior Programme Consultant
Redd Barna (Save the Children Norway), P.O.Box 6902 St Olavs
plass, N-0130 Oslo, Norway. Tel: +47 22990900. e-mail:
post(greddbarna.no
Director, Partnership and Business Development
International Development Research Centre (ICRC), P.O.Box
8500, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1G 3H9. Tel: +1-613-236-
6163/ ext.2535. Fax: +1-613-563-0815 or +1-613-238-7230. e-
mail: aberranger(gidrc.ca
Professor, Chair in Management
Northern Territory University, Casuarina, NT, Australia 0811.
Tel: +61-8-8946-6428. e-mail: p_blunt(gbusiness.ntu.edu.au
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Per Blystad Senior Geologist
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, P.O.Box 600, N-4001
Stavanger, Norway. Tlf. +4751876188 (direct), +4751876000
(general). Fax: +4751876717. e-mail: per.blystad(gnpd.no
Roberta Carey Senior Officer, Technical Assistance Secretariat
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 700 19th Street N.W.,
Washington D.C. 20431, USA. Tel: +202 623-7000. Fax: +202
623-4661
Mahesh Chandra T echnical Director
National Informatics Centre, 66 B pocket iv, Mayur Viha Phase,
Dheli 10091, India. Tel: +91 11 4364635 or private +91 11
2712674. e-mail: mchandra(galpha.nic.in
Kim Forss Consultant
Andante - tools for thinking AB, Biskop Thomas vag 8, S-64534
Strangnas, Sweden. Tlf. +46-152-19700. Fax: +46-152-19700. e-
mail: kim.forss(gmailbox.swipnet.se
Anna Hansson Research Analyst, Public Sector Group
World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Sector Group, 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433,
USA. Tel: +1-202-473-8485. Fax: +1-202-522-7132. e-mail:
ahansson 1 (gworldbank.org
Ole Johan Hauge District Development Advisor
Norwegian Red Cross, P.O.Box 2 Grønland, N-0133 Oslo,
Norway. Tel: + 4722054300. Fax: +4722054343
Pauline Hayes Government and Institutions Advisor
Department for International Development (DFID), 94 Victoria
Street, London SW1E 5JL, United Kingdom, Tel: +44-171-917
0136 (direct), +44-171-917 7000 (DFID). Fax: +44-171-917
0019 (DFID). e-mail: p-hayes(gdfid.gtnet.gov.uk
Liz Higgins Education Advisor
Irish Aid, 76-78 Harcourt Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. Tel: +353-1-
408 2453 (dir), +353-1-478 0822 (gen). Fax: +353-1-408 2626
(dir), +353-1-478 0952 (gen). e-mail: liz.higgins(giveagh.irlgov.
ie(no attachments) or: lhiggins(gioL.ie (home)
Helge Kjekshus Special Advisor (Evaluation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, P.O.Box 8114 Dep, N-0032 Oslo,
Norway. Tel: +4722243514. Fax: +47-2224 2751
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Stein-Erik Kruse Consultant
Centre for Partnership in Development (DiS)
(now: HESO, Revefaret 11, N-0491 Oslo, Norway. e-mail:
sekruse(gonline.no)
Ulf Lie Director
Centre for International University Cooperation (SlU), N-5020
Bergen, Norway. Tel: +47 55 54 6700. Fax: +47 55 54 6720. e-
mail: ulf.lie(gsiu.no
Henrik Lunden Research Asssistant, Seminar Co-ordinator
Chr. Michelsen Institute, P.O.Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892
Bergen, Norway. Tel: + 47 55 5742 47. Fax: + 47 55 5741 66.
e-mail: henrikl(gamadeus.cmi.no
Mahmud Hasan Mansur, Member, Finanee
Rural Electrification Board, Zoar Sahara, Khilkhet, Dhaka 1229,
Bangladesh. Fax: +880-2-896412
Eufrasio Mascarinas Former Mayor
Tubigon Municipality (cio Shirley Ann Bowles, Program Officer,
Federation of Canadian Municipalities International Office, 24
Clarenee Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 5P3, Canada. Tel: +1-613-
241 8484. Fax: +1-613-214-7117)
T anna Mengistu Regional development Advisor
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC),
P.O.Box 412 75, Nairobi, Kenya. Fax: 254-2718415. e-mail:
panico(gifrc.org
Christoph Müller Director, ID/RD Department
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC),
P.O.Box 372, CH-1211 Genève 19, Switzerland. Tel: +41-22-733
4429 / 730 4222 (ext.429). Fax: +41-22-733 0395. e-mail:
muller(gifrc.org
M.M. Ndubiwa Town Clerk
Bulawayo City, Town Clerk's Department, Municipal Buildings,
Fife Street, P.O. Box 591, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Tel: +263-9
75011. Fax: +263-9 69701
Apollinaire Ndurokwigira, Principal Programme Officer
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), P.O.Box 1562,
Harare, Zimbabwe. Tel: +263-4-738 520. Fax: +263-4-702 915.
e-mail: andorukwigira(gworldbank.org
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Nick Norcott Director, Educational Institutions Programme
Canadian International Development Agency (Cida), 200
Promenade du Portage, Hull, Quebec, Canada K1A OG4. Tel: +1-
819-997-6847. Fax: +1-819-997-0513.
Burger Oelofsen Director Fisheries
Ministry of Fisheries, Directorate of Resource Management,
Private bag 13335, Windhoek, Namibia. Tel: +264 612053911.
Fax: +264 61220558. e-mail: boelofsen(Qmfmr.gov.na
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